Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-92-119
Friday
19 June 1992

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FBIS-EEU-92-119 *19 June 1992*

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Croatia

Zagreb radio reports that Croatian President Franjo Tudjman has ordered the "demobilization" of "a part of the Croatian Army reserve units." The demobilization will be implemented by 31 July, and the defense minister will adopt a "special implementation plan" to coincide with the president's order.

Zagreb radio reports that the Croatian Foreign Affairs Ministry has put out an annoucement "refuting" several public statements. The Ministry denies: that Croatia is "strengthening its forces along borders with Bosnia-Hercegovina;" that a "military pact was signed to enable Croatian army units to operate in Bosnia-Hercegovina;" and, finally, the claim that there was information possessed by the Italian Government which states that Croatia was "massing troops along Italy's border with Bosnia." In response to the last claim, Italy's Foreign Affairs Minister Gianni de Michelis added: "If this is proven to be true—then an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council should be called in order to discuss the application of sanctions against Croatia."

Yugoslavia

Serbia—TANJUG reports on the meeting between Serbian Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic and UN General Secretary Butrus Butrus Ghali. Both reviewed "all aspects" of the Yugoslav crisis. Jovanovic stressed that Yugoslavia's aims in Bosnia-Hercegovina "do not differ from those of the United Nations: a ceasefire, continuation of talks, and a definite resolution of the problem of the three peoples living in this republic."

Bosnia-Hercegovina

AFP reports that Serbia and Bosnian-Hercegovina reached an "agreement on removing heavy weapons" from around Sarajevo airport. The agreement calls for Serbian tanks and artillery to be moved back 30 kilometers from the airport to six sites to be placed under "permanent control of U.N. peacekeepers." While the Serbian Government has already signed the agreement, a UN spokesman said that "technical reasons prevented the Bosnian side from signing the accord."

President Berisha Asks U.S. Albanians for Aid

AU1806174492 Tirana ATA in English 0812 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Text] Tirana, June 18 (ATA)—The collaborator of The Voice of America Elez Biberaj stresses among others that President Berisha in the meeting he had with the Albanians of America on June 16 in the evening asked them to coordinate their activity to help Albania to overcome the actual crisis.

President Berisha said that Albania needs more than ever the help of the Albanians of America. President Berisha said that finally Albania has opened the door to all the Albanians and added:

"The Albanian culture, Albanian thinking, Albanian clergy have had their distinguished figures in the United States of America. Albanian thinkers and colossi such as Fan Noli and Konica worked in the United States. Their tradition was followed with dignity by Arshi Pipa, Semi Repishti, Z. Gashi, Rexhep Krasniqi, and scores of others. Hence Albania embarked onto a new road. It started its revival. It is not my duty to ask you to help Albania, because I know well that you love Albania as much as I do, as much as all others. But there is an obligation toward you, toward all Albanians wherever they are. We shall fulfill it within some weeks by granting to all the Albanians wherever they are two nationalities. In fact, through this we do not at all intend to destabilize the Balkans because we are ready to accord double nationality also to all those who want Albanian nationality. But on this occasion we are stretching our hands and are giving the possibility to you, your children, your nephews to take part in the political life of the Albanians. We would be delighted to vote tomorrow for a president emerging from your fold, emerging from the diaspora wherever it is, emerging from the fold of Albanians all over the world. Suffice he represents us all. Democracy will work for us as for all the other nations. Through this act I want at the same time to make possible to all the Albanians wherever they are to take part in the recovery of the Albanian economy, because the brother cannot discriminate his own brother. They will enjoy the same rights and these people are not at least going to lose their money in Albania. I ensure you that no one will lose his money. Albania is a blessed land, a rich one. All will profit from the investment and engagement in its economic reconstruction."

People's Assembly Discusses Surveillance Equipment

AU1806143692 Tirana ATA in English 0921 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Text] Tirana, June 18 (ATA)—Following the statements by the Foreign Minister Mr. Serreqi on the existence of bugging devices in his office, following the statements over the television by the two former heads of this ministry, Kapllani and Bocka, the ex-chief of the Protocol Cifliku, and of the National Information Service, Irakli Kocollari, the "Watergate" of the Foreign Ministry became a subject of discussion also at the People's Assembly.

The parliament should not keep silence on this, the Socialist deputy Dokle, chairman of his parliamentarian group, said. Raising the question "Who has installed the bugging devices?," he demanded that a temporary parliamentary commission be created or the People's Assembly Foreign Commission be informed on this problem. If the Albanian "Watergate" is true, he added, the severest legal actions should be taken. If it is a sensation for diplomatic prestige or to dismiss people from work, a motion of non-confidence or of confidence for the foreign minister should be demanded.

The Democrat Deputy Baleta said that it is useless to raise the motion demanded by Mr. Dokle, as the persons manoeuvring them accepted the existence of these devices. He stated to the ATA correspondent that so far only the iceberg's top has come out on surface, that it is indispensable to find where do the terminals of these devices really lead to.

I do not agree with the "calming injection," Mr. Kocollari, the chief of the National Information Service, tried to make to the public opinion. I am for the creation of a special commission on this question, but the Investigation Office and the Attorney's Office should concern themselves into this question, he said.

The Social Democrat Teodor Laco said to the ATA reporter that the overthrown system had been raised on the basis of dishonesty, of bugging. We should not be surprised to learn of other such scandals.

Macedonian Border Guards Kill Albanian Citizen

AU1806060592 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 17 Jun 92

[Telephone report by Ilia Spiro—from Pogradec]

[Text] The District Executive Committee has reported that Macedonian border guards in Border Zone No. 7 based in Pogradec, recently shot and killed Gjergji Silo, a 32-year-old Albanian citizen from the village of Potkozhan in Pogradec District, in violation of the agreement reached between our two countries. This is the ninth time during the 12 February-12 June period that Macedonian border guards have (?used firearms) and have killed four (?unarmed) Albanian citizens.

These incidents, the report states, have occurred during mass illegal border crossings, not for the purpose of meeting relatives or to find employment on the other side of the border, but for illegal sales of livestock and theft of property of Macedonian citizens.

Nevertheless, these illegal border crossings should not lead to the use of firearms. Other ways must be found to seize and hand over these people, regardless of what the Macedonian side may claim.

Havel May Meet Meciar, Klaus in Bratislava

LD1906095892 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech 0900 GMT 19 Jun 92

[Excerpts] The topic of today's talks by the chairmen of the Civic Democratic Party and the Movement for Democratic Slovakia, Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir Meciar, which are under way in Bratislava, is to appoint specific people to the government of the joint state for the coming period. [passage omitted]

The jurisdictions of the government of the joint state for the coming period was decided upon by the delegation of experts from the Civic Democratic Party and the Movement for Democratic Slovakia. The results of yesterday's talks include a working proposal of the policy statement of the Federal government. Asked how long this government will be in office, Rudolf Filkus, from the Movement for Democratic Slovakia, said nobody is reducing [nikdo nesnizuje] the existence of the common government from the viewpoint of the length of its period in office and its ability to function. [passage omitted] Rudolf Filkus insists that the citizens decide in a referendum if the state will split. [passage omitted]

According to further information there is a possibility that Vaclav Havel will arrive in Bratislava this afternoon so Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir Meciar could immediately inform him about the results of their talks.

Havel Favors Same Referendum Throughout Country

AU1906085292 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 13 Jun 92 p 1

[Interview with Vaclav Havel, president of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, by Marcela Pechackova in Prague at "two o'clock this morning": "President Supports Referendum"]

[Text] [Pechackova] The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia representatives intend to hold a referendum. How do you feel about it?

[Havel] I did not understand from the news conference following the talks between the Civic Democratic Party and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia what kind of referendum they are talking about. We have a referendum law that specifies in Article 1, Section 1 that a referendum on the constitutional arrangement of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic may be called if parliament proposes such a referendum to the president. If the president finds that the question is unambiguously stated, he must call the referendum. It is a referendum that is held across the entire territory of the federation.

[Pechackova] This is clearly not the type of referendum the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia has in mind....

[Havel] There is another possibility for a referendum—according to Section 2, one that is called by the president on a proposal from a national council. This referendum can only concern the secession of one of the republics from the federation.

[Pechackova] What should the question be?

[Havel] It must be a clear-cut question. The law says that it is necessary for one of the alternatives presented in the referendum to receive an absolute majority of votes in order for even the outcome of the referendum to be recognized. This automatically excludes any question that would allow for three or five different answers, because in such a case it would not be possible to guarantee an absolute majority for any of the specified alternatives. So, it was not clear to me under which section the referendum should be held. The referendum considered in the discussion involved the proposal to the president by the Slovak National Council, and that could only be a referendum on secession from the federation.

[Pechackova] So, what do you suggest?

[Havel] As is generally known, I support the idea of a referendum. I have been suggesting it for more than two years. Nonetheless, the political forces should make it clear what kind of referendum it will be so as to stay within our current constitutional law. I believe that the Federal Assembly should discuss it at its first session, and possibly request a referendum on constitutional arrangement on the entire territory of the federation.

Meciar Denies Provoking Breakup of Federation

AU1806164192 Vienna DER STANDARD in German 17-18 Jun 92 p 2

["Exclusive" interview with Vladimir Meciar, chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, by Erhard Stackl in Vienna on 16 June: "No Yugoslavia Is Imminent Here"]

[Text] [Stackl] How was your talk with President Havel?

[Meciar] It had two aspects. A personal one, regarding whether we will support his candidacy. We will not support it, which will make his reelection impossible. The second aspect concerned the future of Czechoslovak relations. The president takes the view that the preservation of the federation is essential. We claim that it is possible to respect mutual interests of the Czechs and Slovaks, while we could act as two nations in international relations.

[Stackl] You will have a talk with Mr. Klaus. Where is there agreement and which questions are open?

[Meciar] Mr. Klaus gives two alternatives: The preservation of the present federation or the complete disintegration of the state with the liquidation of all relations. We propose to keep the joint market, financial administration, and defense, and to coordinate foreign policy as two states. In that case, the Czech side only wants to accept a customs union. Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that the federal parliament can start its work on 25 June. The

election of the president is only possible when there are several candidates. I take it for granted that Mr. Havel will no longer be president.

[Stackl] Havel is internationally known and very popular. Might it not be negative for you if you blocked his reelection?

[Meciar] We all have the choice between popularity and acting in line with one's responsibility. Gross political mistakes were made, for example, the inability to cooperate with the parliament. The development of the castle (Havel's official residence) as a new political center was unconstitutional. All Czechoslovak relations were coordinated by President Havel and all resulted in failure. He is responsible for it.

[Stackl] Your critics are claiming that you want to provoke the breakup of the federation by exaggerated demands.

[Meciar] No. We have said that we respect the constitutional state. We are for renewal of all federal organs and the measures that are within the scope of the Constitution. Everything should develop calmly. No Yugoslavia is imminent here.

[Stackl] Will your party, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, enter into the federal government?

[Meciar] Not me. This is unacceptable because of the propaganda that was made against me. Our movement is prepared to conclude a federal coalition. One condition is a political agreement with Mr. Klaus on the government program for the near future. We stated that we want to declare the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic.

[Stackl] When?

[Meciar] In the foreseeable future, probably in July. In August we want to resolve Slovakia's constitution and by the end of the year we want to hold a referendum on whether the citizens want to live in a joint state.

[Stackl] Representatives of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia have announced that they would strive for territorial autonomy if sovereignty is declared.

[Meciar] In the area where 560,000 Hungarians are living there are also 1.2 million Slovaks, and they do not have separate settlements. Division of the territory is not possible.

[Stackl] What effects on geopolitics and security would Slovakia's complete independence have? The situation is very troubled in your eastern neighborhood.

[Meciar] The neighbors are occupied with themselves. Hungary engages some of its military forces at the borders with Yugoslavia and Romania. Ukraine has forces at the Russian borders. We are not afraid of possible conflicts.

[Stackl] You are often characterized as a leftist and friend of nationalization.

[Meciar] We are abused by leftist and rightist parties. This proves that we are in the center. We are for a pluralist democracy, there is no way back to socialism. Privatization will be continued, some things will be changed, which, however, will result in enrichment, not in a halt. The market mechanism is a condition for us, but it must be a social market in the Austrian way. For Mr. Klaus, social means the same as socialist. We clearly orient ourselves with the West, we think that Austria is a key country with which we can have most promising relations. We must only overcome the barrier of distrust.

Politicians Differ on Future of Security Service

AU1906084792 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 16 Jun 92 p 6

[Alena Pavlova and Sabina Slonkova report: "To Abolish or To Reform the Federal Security and Information Service"]

[Text] According to what Vladimir Meciar said on Sunday, it is impossible to reform the Federal Security and Information Service [FIS]. There are so many flaws in its work that the For a Democratic Slovakia Movement [HZDS] will demand the establishment of a new secret service.

"There are people in the FIS whom we do not want there," said HZDS Press Spokesman Jozef Sucha. "The secret service is taking completely improper action. To give one example, there is the recent screening of the journalists. The abolishing of the FIS should become a topic of serious discussion, in which experts would judge the feasibility of establishing a new information service."

Miroslav Macek, Civic Democratic Party [ODS] deputy chairman, said: "As the reason for abolishing the FIS, the HZDS representatives gave, for example, the fact that the FIS was illegally tapping and shadowing Mr. Meciar. We assumed a general standpoint—and I stress this—that we may have objections against people in the FIS, yet this is no reason to abolish the entire FIS. Irrespective of the fact that it employs these people, the FIS has its 'own wisdom'. To begin building an organization from scratch would be more difficult than to implement possible changes in personnel and organization."

According to ODS Press Spokesman Jiri Schneider, the destiny of the FIS is one of the points on which the ODS differs from the HZDS. Individual issues on the agenda of the discussions are not, according to him, as important as the platform that both parties adopted—whether they speak about federation or not. "The question is whether the HZDS model—according to which the FIS should be abolished—is compatible with the idea of federation or not. We do not know what makes the HZDS take such steps, whether it is because they reject the federation, or for different reasons. I am of the opinion that the federation must have its secret service. Without its existence the state is virtually without defense," Jiri Schneider said yesterday.

Is it really possible to abolish the secret service without having some of its components transferred into the new organization? This is what we asked Jiri Novotny, official from the President of the Republic's Office and former FIS director.

"It is possible. We proved it in the case of the State Security [StB]. It is possible to abolish a secret service only when there is a clear concept for replacing it. I consider it as very irresponsible to abolish the FIS today. It is a completely new organization and therefore it is strange that precisely this body should be abolished."

What are your objections to its work?

"It takes several years to build a secret service. This is why the FIS makes mistakes. If it is replaced by a new organization, it is logical that this new organization will make the same mistakes. It is possible to rehire former StB members, and the secret service would possibly avoid errors. However, I do not consider this solution as the most favorable one."

According to a former FIS official, John Bok, a mistake was made when the FIS was being established. In his opinion, there should have been a new concept for the FIS and the rules of the former StB should not have been adopted. "The state cannot function without its own information service. Mr. Meciar knows it, and this is why he does not want to abolish the FIS without replacement. It is clear that he would establish his own new secret service to serve his own needs. Of course, this is my opinion," Bok says.

Slovak Nationalists Hope Negotiations Fail

AU1806111292 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 13 Jun 92 p 2

[CSTK report: "Schadenfreude"]

[Text] Bratislava—According to Slovak National Party [SNS] Chairman Jozef Prokes, the SNS has not yet concluded any coalition agreements. However, during talks with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and the Party of the Democratic Left, it agreed with them on a course of action for dealing with the issue of Slovakia's constitutional and legal arrangement.

"The more unsuccessful the negotiations between the HZDS and the Civic Democratic Party, the more we like it," said Jozef Prokes in connection with the prospects for the talks between the election winners. He assumes the HZDS will make the correct choice, that is, a choice involving reducing the size of the Federal Government as much as possible and loosening the ties between the Czech and Slovak Republics.

Left Bloc Claims ODS Exceeding Jurisdiction

AU1806111592 Prague TELEGRAF in Czech 13 Jun 92 p 2

[CSTK report: "The Left Bloc Writes To the President"]

[Text] Prague—According to the Left Bloc, the second strongest Czech parliamentary party, the results of the negotiations to date between the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] and the Movement For a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] deviate significantly from the mandate President Vaclav Havel granted to ODS Chairman Vaclav Klaus when he asked him to hold negotiations on forming a new Federal Government. Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia Chairman Jiri Svoboda and CSFR Democratic Left Chairman Lotar Indruch made this statement in an open letter sent by the Left Bloc to President Havel yesterday.

"According to the Constitution, ODS and HZDS representatives have a single task, that is, to recommend the formation of a Federal Government and to agree upon the fundamental points of the government's policy. Instead, they are concentrating their negotiations on controversial discussions on a specific form for the constitutional and legal arrangement," states the Left Bloc in the letter. According to the letter, the Left Bloc is of the opinion that the ODS and the HZDS are exceeding their jurisdiction in the negotiations.

Slovak National Council To Open 23 June

AU1706140592 Prague CSTK in English 1626 GMT 15 Jun 92

[Text] Bratislava—According to Slovak Parliament Chairman Frantisek Miklosko, the parliament Presidium agreed today that a representative of the Movement For a Democratic Slovakia will be authorised to hold talks on forming a new Slovak Government. However, he said, a new government will be appointed only by a new parliament Presidium.

Miklosko said new chairman and deputy chairmen of the parliament will be elected at the parliament's constituent session, convened for June 23.

Havel Praises Slovak Constitutional Bill

LD1806115392 Prague CSTK in English 1108 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Text] Prague June 17 (CSTK)—Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel today described a Slovak Parliament bill on the adoption of a Slovak Constitution and on arranging Czech-Slovak relations as a sign of goodwill in the search to find a solution to the current stalemate on the Czechoslovak political scene.

In a meeting with a delegation of the Slovak Democratic Left Party (SDL), led by Chairman Peter Weiss, who informed Havel of the SDL-prepared bill, Havel said he doubts, however, that the bill is likely to pass in view of the differences of opinion between the SDL and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS).

Weiss said the bill is aimed at giving a clear constitutional framework to further steps in searching for a suitable form of coexistence of the Czech and Slovak republics. "The bill settles both the issue of sovereignty

of the two republics and the question of an agreement between them", Weiss said. The passing of the bill could provide certain guarantees that constitutional norms will be respected until a definitive decision on the form of coexistence of the two republics is made, he added.

Weiss confirmed his party is in favour of Czechoslovakia being a loose cooperating federation. "While the HZDS expects the Czech and Slovak Republics to set up only several joint coordinating bodies, we are speaking of bodies of state administration that would have the attributes of administrative bodies of a common state", Weiss said.

Commenting to reporters on the current talks between the HZDS and the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), Weiss said disputes between them should be transferred to parliamentary soil as soon as possible. "It is up to the republic and federal parliaments to decide whether a common state will be maintained", he said.

Weiss also said Sunday's session of the SDL Republic Council will decide whether or not the SDL will support any of the presidential candidates.

Sacher Not To Run Against Havel for President

LD1806085692 Prague Federal 1 Television Network in Czech 1730 GMT 17 Jun 92

[Text] Vladimir Meciar and Richard Sacher, former Federal Interior Minister, met at the Federal Assembly today. The daily press has been writing a lot recently about contacts between these two politicians. Thus, we have asked Mr. Sacher about the topics discussed during their meeting today.

[Begin recording] [Sacher] I have been meeting regularly with Mr. Meciar for the past two years. We have been briefing each other on political views on the situation. This was also the case this morning.

[Unidentifed correspondent] What are your views and what are Mr. Meciar's views?

[Sacher] I think that because I try to look at Slovak needs through Slovak eyes there is a lot we agree on.

[Correspondent] As you are on such friendly terms with Mr. Meciar, could you tell me why he is so vehemently against the candidacy of Vaclav Havel?

[Sacher] I think that for a large part there may be some personal reasons. Maybe from the MFDS side it could be that Mr. Havel as a person is being linked with some statements with which MFDS does not agree possibly.

[Correspondent] Such as?

[Sacher] I do not know but I think the reason is in this.

[Correspondent] Would you be willing to stand as a candidate for this post? Has your view changed since that of two days ago?

[Sacher] I have said clearly that I could never stand against Mr. Vaclav Havel as a counter candidate, not at all. I respect Mr. Havel very much from the human aspect and if I should stand, if someone nominates me, then it would be only in new elections. Certainly the case is not as described by TELEGRAF today that Sacher is waiting in the wings. I do not have to wait for anything. I can earn a living in a different way. I am not rejoicing or anything like that about this. [end recording]

Institute Analysis Discusses Economic Decline

AU1906064692 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 15 Jun 92 p 8

["Abridged introductory summary chapter" of a "macroeconomic and social analysis of the Czechoslovak economy" compiled by a research team of the Economic Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences: "The Czechoslovak Economy at the Beginning of the Year; Macroeconomic and Social Analysis: Spring 1992"]

[Text] In our news coverage, we have reported on the latest regular macroeconomic and social analysis of the Czechoslovak economy by the Economic Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. The analysis was compiled by a team of researchers headed by engineer Kamil Janacek. Today we publish in a somewhat abridged form the introductory summary chapter of the analysis. We will return to this analysis in one of our next issues:

The present state of the transformation of the Czechoslovak economy is distinguished by greatly conflicting tendencies. There has been a major decline in output and gross domestic product, which has been caused by:

—The disintegration of the markets in the former CEMA countries, especially the Soviet market. Some of the production oriented toward this territory is completely unsalable on other markets.

—The sharp fall in domestic demand for consumer and capital goods as a result of price liberalization, the pre-privatization climate in most state enterprises, and the collapse of traditional linkages among Czechoslovak enterprises.

—The beginning decline of the material-intensiveness of Czechoslovak production, which has made itself felt in the lowering of domestic demand for some raw and intermediary materials.

On the other hand, in some branches and enterprises it is possible to observe the start of economic recovery:

—The development of the private sector, especially in trade and services. The faster development of the private sector in Bohemia is one of the causes of the less palpable impact of economic transformation in the Czech Republic, compared with Slovakia. In 1991 the private sector accounted for almost 10 percent of the gross domestic product generated in the Czech

Republic, against 4 percent in Slovakia. The development of the private sector analogously influences the creation of new jobs, the number of which is estimated at 1 million. It is legitimate to infer from this that the disparate levels of unemployment in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia are caused, among other factors, by disparate growth rates of the private sector.

—Growing exports to countries with advanced market economies. The devaluation of the Czechoslovak koruna and the loss of Eastern markets have compelled numerous producers to seek compensation on the markets of advanced economies, especially in EC countries. Following the 10-percent rise in exports to this territory in 1991, the growth continued at the same pace also in the first quarter of 1992. It is possible to draw the conclusion that a certain (still relatively smaller) part of companies has succeeded in offsetting the loss of the CEMA market. Czechoslovakia's undisputed comparative advantage, compared with some neighboring transforming economies, dwells in the exchange rate and the wage level.

—Successful inflation control. The quarterly rate of inflation has not exceeded two to three percent since the second half of 1991. This has drastically reduced inflation expectations of both households and businesses and has been reflected in the households' growing savings rate and in the creation of deposits by enterprises. The enhanced investment activity in some segments of the economy could be explained also by this factor.

—The decline of consumer demand has been halted in the first quarter of 1992 and, based on the moderate rise in real income, consumer demand can be expected to slightly increase, compared with last year, although this increase is likely to be greatly differentiated.

The greatly conflicting and strongly differentiated development is typical of both the economy as a whole and individual branches and sectors. In general, the principle holds true that the dividing line between successful and unsuccessful enterprises runs within rather than between branches and sectors. Enterprises with good export performance, links with foreign capital, or a good management significantly differ from the rest.

After an inevitable delay, the partial writing off of the debts of state enterprises and the strengthening of the commercial banks' capital position are beginning to make themselves positively felt. This has made it possible, among other things, to orient more than the entire increment of the credit volume in the first quarter of the year toward the private sector. Other measures taken by the government within the framework of the policy of promoting private enterprise, such as the establishment of the Zarucni Banka [Guarantee Bank], the possibility of having some of the credit interest rates refunded in the event of participation in designated programs, and the like, will also gradually make themselves felt.

The transformation of the economy has had a disparate effect on industry and agriculture. The differences are apparent not only when comparing agriculture with the other links of the food production chain but also with the other economic sectors. As a result of the price development and a number of other factors connected with the transformation of the Czechoslovak economy, the income situation in agriculture has become critical. The negative consequences of this situation will be projected also into the process of privatizing state farms and transforming agricultural cooperatives and into the agricultural reproduction process. This creates a certain risk as regards guaranteeing agricultural production at the level of projected food self-sufficiency.

The development of the prices of farm products has been different in principle from the development of producer and consumer prices. In the course of 1991, the index of producer prices increased by an average of almost three-quarters, the index of prices of construction work by almost three-fifths, and the index of consumer prices by somewhat less than three-quarters. Of this, food prices increased by more than 60 percent and non-food prices by 90 percent. Only the prices of farm products stagnated. The 1991 prices of farm products were, on average, 3.8 percent higher than in 1989. Compared with the preceding year, they did not increase at all. This trend continued also in the first quarter of 1992. The prices of farm products stagnated while the price level of a number of important agricultural inputs went up.

The aggregate impact of the fall in demand, the stagnating prices of farm products, the significant increase in the prices of inputs, the substantial cut in the volume of agricultural subsidies, and the worsening of credit terms has reached such dimensions that not even extraordinary savings in costs could prevent an overall loss in agriculture (10 billion korunas in 1991). Some 73 percent of agricultural cooperatives and 87 percent of state farms are operating at a loss.

This situation has been contributed to, among other factors, by the fact that in its economic policy the government has thus far been paying substantially less attention to agriculture than to other sectors. The less advanced stage in the transformation of agriculture, compared with other sectors of the economy, could potentially become a source of tension and economic difficulties.

A relatively positive development has been registered in external economic relations. The trade balance for the first quarter of 1992 shows a surplus of 4.4 billion korunas. The entire surplus is accounted for by exports from the Czech Republic. The surplus in the trade balance is also reflected in the surplus of the current account of the balance of payments in convertible currencies, which reached $295 million in the first quarter of 1992. In the same period foreign exchange reserves reached $3.65 billion, which is equivalent to approximately four months worth of imports. At the same time gross indebtedness declined from $9.4 to $9.1 billion.

Particularly positive is the fact that the influx of direct foreign investments amounted to $230 million in the first quarter of 1992.

The labor market has registered a continuous decline in the number of unemployed in the first four months of the year. The decline, which applies to both republics, results from a number of factors:

—The introduction of more rigid terms for the payment of unemployment benefits has prompted the unemployed to look more actively for a new job.

—Both the creation of jobs in the growing private sector and the Czech and Slovak Governments' policy oriented toward the creation of jobs beneficial to the community are making themselves positively felt. Particularly successful has been the solution to the unemployment of fresh graduates of secondary schools and universities in the form of so-called assistant jobs, financed from the funds of labor offices. As a result, the rate of unemployment in this category dropped to below 10 percent, which is a very low figure by West European standards.

—The pre-privatization situation in most state enterprises, a situation that is characterized not by the endeavor to maintain the level of production, as has been the case thus far, but by the endeavor to maintain the level of employment. The solution of the problem of overemployment is being passed to the new management or to the post-privatization period.

The regional and structural differentiation on the labor market continues. The rate of unemployment in Slovakia is about three times higher than in the Czech Republic. The proportion of unemployed with elementary education is growing, while the proportion of university-educated unemployed is declining. The proportion of women in the total number of unemployed is substantially higher than their share in the population of working age at large. Regions with a one-sided orientation of industry, in particular, are affected by a higher rate of unemployment. Unemployment in some regions has also been affected by the ongoing changes in agriculture, particularly by the disintegration of large state farms that started in 1991.

The growth of income from wages slowed in 1991 and income from agriculture declined, while income from transfer payments grew at a relatively fast pace. As a result, the proportion of transfer payments in aggregate income increased while the proportion of income from gainful employment declined. Whereas real earnings declined by 26 percent in 1991, the real value of old-age pensions declined less severely, by approximately 19 percent. In social policy, emphasis was put on compensating the growth of prices in transfer payments (the average old-age pension, for example, reached 73 percent of the average net wages in 1991, which was the highest level since 1954). This development significantly contributed to the social feasibility of the first stage in the transformation of the Czechoslovak economy.

In the first quarter of 1992 the development of nominal incomes greatly differed from the development of real incomes. While nominal incomes increased 25.6 percent, real incomes increased 8 percent, and real wages increased over 4 percent. The decline in real incomes has been halted. At the same time the rate of growth of incomes from gainful employment increased and the proportion of incomes from gainful employment in aggregate incomes has started to grow again.

The differentiation of incomes continues as a result of wage differentiation, the development of private enterprise, and, last but not least, extrajudicial rehabilitation. Of course, property restitution mainly has an influence on property differentiation, which is always more profound than income differentiation.

The question of how Czechoslovak society, in which income and property equality had struck very deep roots, will come to terms with this new element represents a fundamental problem. Although the drift toward income equality had often been a target of criticism and the majority acknowledges the need for a more marked application of the merit principle, greater property differences a priori arouse aversion. This attitude is similar to the recognition of the need for a radical economic reform on the one hand and the simultaneous demand for a maximum degree of social security on the other. It needs to be said that similar inconsistent attitudes are typical of contemporary Czechoslovak society. Moreover, the differentiation of incomes and property is taking place under conditions of a drastic loss of social comfort and, partially, of social guarantees as well. It is therefore to be expected that the social consequences of the ongoing changes are, and will be, palpable.

Development in 1991 indicated that self-restraint and abstention in consumer behavior, as well as the renewed tendency to save, could become longer-term trends. The tendency to decide from a longer-term perspective and the attempts to diversify economic activities securing financial resources for one's household were also becoming increasingly evident.

Developments over the first four months of 1992 confirm these trends. Although the growth rate of private spending tripled, compared with the same period a year ago, it remained substantially below the growth rate of incomes.

The lead of incomes over expenditures testifies to a positive shift in the financial behavior of the population. It has made itself felt in the preference given to savings over final consumption and in the endeavor to create financial reserves for entrepreneurial intentions and to cover higher cost payments. The population already reacts to the uncertain economic development through behavior according to the normal algorithms of a market economy, that is, by accumulating monetary reserves rather than by hoarding goods. A new form of the economic behavior of households is gradually taking shape and demand and consumption have stabilized in a new structure. There are, however, limits to this stabilization in terms of time and volume.

Foreign Affairs Spokesman Gives Press Briefing

AU1906085292 Budapest MTI in English 1152 GMT 16 Jun 92

[Text] Budapest 16 Jun (MTI)—The fact that the parliamentary assembly of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will hold its first session in Budapest from July 3 to 6 is highly appreciated by Hungarian diplomatic circles.

The summit closing the Helsinki follow-up meeting will also be held in Budapest on July 9-10.

Speaking to journalists today, Foreign Affairs Spokesman Janos Herman recalled the decision passed by the CSCE countries, parliamentary deputies in Madrid last April to call into being the Parliament of the Helsinki Process.

In their Budapest meeting on May 22, the delegation heads decided that the parliamentary assembly would deal with security, economic and human rights issues.

Gyorgy Szabad, president of the Hungarian National Assembly, will open the session on July 3, and Prime Minister Jozsef Antall will welcome the participants, including the current president of the CSCE Council, the foreign minister of Czechoslovakia.

Talks so far about placing relations between Hungary and Romania on a new footing have yielded agreement on several questions, although a number of relevant questions are still open, states the aid-memoire drawn up about the talks in Bucharest in early June.

According to the document, no agreement has yet been reached as to the setting up of a minority joint committee, the wording of the joint minority statement, the reopening of consulate generals, the restoration of the Hungarian historic memorial in Arad and the access of Hungarians to the Romanian documents relating to the 1956 Hungarian revolution.

Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky and Defence Minister Lajos Fur will represent Hungary at the Bonn ministerial session of the Western European Union on June 19. First-time invitees include the foreign and defence ministers of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

One of this year's plenums at the Lichtenstein forum foundation will be devoted exclusively to Hungary, with Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky giving a lecture on the recent political changes and the country's foreign political endeavours.

Ivcan Baba, deputy secretary of state in charge of the East European countries, will leave for Sofia on June 22-23 to finalise the new basic treaty between Hungary and Bulgaria. An agreement on cooperation between the two foreign ministries will also be concluded.

Denes Tomaj, deputy secretary of state responsible for the developing countries, will be visiting Angola and the Republic of South Afria from June 18 to 22. He will officially open the Hungarian Embassy in Johannesburg.

In reply to a question, Herman confirmed Hungary's continuing stand for NATO peacekeeping forces to be sent to Kosovo and Vojvodina. The idea was first raised by Jeszenszky during the NATO council's session in Oslo, and then outlined at the CSCE conference in Helsinki by Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati. "This dovetails with Hungary's foreign political line that has supported preventive diplomatic measures since the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis," Herman said.

UN Embargo Halts Russian Gas Supplies to Serbia

LD1806155192 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Text] Complaint in Belgrade against Hungary. The TANJUG news agency in Belgrade claims that 65 factories have been forced to close down in Serbia because Hungary, in compliance with the Security Council embargo, refuses to allow Russian natural gas through to the southern Slav republic. The director of the Hungarian Oil and Gas Industry Joint Stock Company [Gabor Jozsef], which operates the gas pipeline, has admitted in HVG [economic weekly] that they have stopped the flow of Russian gas to Serbia. At the same time Gabor Jozsef also said that they continue to deliver Russian energy to Bosnia through Serbian territory.

UN Ambassador Meets Yugoslavia's Jovanovic

LD1806202692 Budapest MTI in English 0824 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Text] New York, June 18 (MTI)—Hungary feels itself bound to observe all sanctions introduced under UN Security Council Resolution 757, but will take no steps beyond them, Hungarian UN Ambassador Andre Erdos told Yugoslavian Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic in New York on Wednesday [17 June]. He added that Hungarian diplomacy would be marked by flexibility and pragmatism.

Jovanovic outlined Belgrade's position on the situation that emerged on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The meeting took place at the foreign minister's request, Erdos told the New York correspondent of MTI.

The time is ripe for the UN Security Council to revise its sanctions against Yugoslavia and consider the initiatives of the Belgrade Government, Jovanovic said.

Erdos said that, in the interest of the soonest possible lifting of sanctions, Belgrade should exert pressure on the Serbians living outside Serbia so as to put an end to the untenable situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The Belgrade Government is convinced that only a solution which considers the interests of all three communities is conceivable in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Jovanovic said.

By-pass Canal Apparently Now Filled With Water

LD1806160592 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1300 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Text] At Bos [Gabcikovo] the water level has not risen in recent days and it allows us to conclude that in Slovakia the filling of the by-pass canal with water from the Danube has ended. Government expert Adrien Hajosi also said that the filling started during the last week of last month. As is well-known, the Hungarian Government immediately protested the step which violates the law. At that time Prague said that further steps regarding the dam will be taken by the new government and by that time the filling will be carried out continuously.

Antall, Kadar Holds Talks With Iran's Kalantari

LD1806223992 Budapest MTI in English 1357 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Text] Budapest, June 18 (MTI)—In Budapest on Thursday [18 June], Iranian Minister of Agriculture Isa Kalantari extended an invitation to Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall for a visit to Iran.

Kalantari is paying an official visit here as co-chairman of the Hungarian-Iranian joint committee which is holding its 8th session.

Antall accepted the invitation, with the date of the visit to be fixed through diplomatic channels.

The prime minister's press office told MTI that the meeting was attended by Bela Kadar, minister of international economic relations and co-chairman of the joint committee, and Endre Marinovich, cabinet chief of the prime minister.

The talks covered bilateral relations and the situation in East-Central Europe and the Middle East. The two parties agreed that business links are increasing between the two countries, and both governments seek to encourage further growth in turnover.

Antall pointed out the important role played by Iran in Hungary's international system of economic and political relations.

Iran is assuming growing importance in the Middle East, particularly now that the former Soviet republics in Central Asia have become independent.

The idea of Hungarian-Iranian cooperation in Central Asian markets also came up during the meeting.

Discuss Economic Relations

LD1906093592 Budapest MTI in English 1530 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Text] Budapest, June 18 (MTI)—The session of the Hungarian-Iranian Joint Committee ended with the signing of a protocol in Budapest on Thursday [18 June] by Hungarian Minister of International Economic Relations Bela Kadar and Isa Kalantari, Iranian minister of agriculture.

After the ceremony, Kadar said bilateral relations had undergone a powerful development over the past two years. The value of trade turnover stood at 90 million dollars in 1990, but rose to 290 million in 1991. By today, Iran is an important market of Hungary, with 2 per cent of gross Hungarian exports delivered there. Engineering industry products account for 40 per cent of exports.

Iranian oil deliveries were also discussed at the session. Hungary earlier concluded an agreement on purchasing an annual 1 million tonnes of oil. Deliveries began last year, but were discontinued when the Adriatic oil pipeline was shut down.

Experts are currently examining how the oil could reach Hungary, while the pipeline is inoperable.

Iran continues to purchase Hungarian Ikarus buses, of which 1,000 are already in use in Tehran. A new order for 300 buses is currently being met.

Pawlak Interviewed on Political Objectives

AU1806104792 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 12-14 Jun 92 p 2

[Interview with Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak by Zbigniew Gajewski and Krzysztof Kotowski on 11 June; place not given: "Objective Necessity Has Made A Farmers' Representative Become Prime Minister"]

[Text] [NOWA EUROPA] Even your closest coalition partners fear your party is going to defend parochial rural interests. Are you going to bow to pressure to protect the interests of the rural community at the expense of other social groups?

[Pawlak] The Polish Peasant Party [PSL] has been making it clear for a long time that its main concern is to resolve national issues. In our economic rescue program we concentrated mainly on macroeconomic issues, and some of our postulates were included among the activities of the previous government. Now it will certainly be much easier to implement concrete solutions. I do not deny the fact that farming will receive our full attention, but PSL politicians have been saying for a long time that agricultural issues can only be resolved if national issues are resolved first, for it is easier to incorporate agriculture in national economic problems if the economy is efficient. How is this to be done? It has already reached the stage where farmers are not merely the owners of farms, but also employers and investors at the same time. Modern farms require technological equipment, and food processing plants are now beginning to appear in rural areas. If we look at this in terms of objectives, and not in terms of historical symbolism or social divisions, then it is easy to notice the connection between rural and non-rural entrepreneurs, people who are dynamic, industrious, and desirous of success. It is obvious that somewhat different rules apply to agriculture than to, for example, the retail trade. But it also lies in the country's interests to balance out the rules of the economic game so that maximum results can be achieved on a nationwide scale.

[NOWA EUROPA] But if national interests came into conflict with rural interests, on whose side would you be?

[Pawlak] Right now I am in a position that requires a general view of things. My experience so far in various kinds of talks teaches me that if there is a desire to reach an accord, it is possible to do so to the satisfaction of both sides.

[NOWA EUROPA] Several days ago you invited some groups who did not support your candidacy for prime minister, such as the Christian-National Union [ZChN], to join the government. Is your invitation still valid?

[Pawlak] During my talks with the president about plans for the government, I suggested the merger of two coalition groups; on the one hand the small coalition, and on the other the peasant-Christian bloc.

[NOWA EUROPA] But the ZChN is clearly attacking and opposing a government headed by you. Are you still ready for a compromise in such a situation?

[Pawlak] I do not think there are any situations in politics that permit one to erase the future and say "never." If one has that kind of approach, he makes compromise impossible, and he should find himself another job. From my personal talks with some ZChN representatives I have the impression that they have a somewhat different view of this matter. They seem to want a compromise. But I think that is the ZChN's internal problem.

[NOWA EUROPA] In Poland there are still people opposed to the present version of Poland's association agreements, for example with the EC. The PSL has also expressed reservations.

[Pawlak] I beg your pardon, but if you listened to the Sejm debate on this subject, you would have noticed that the PSL expressed a very unequivocal stance. Please express your doubts clearly. I think our stance offered a compromise acceptable to all sides.

We have said that the agreement on EC association is also our objective and presents a great chance for the Polish economy. But the economy should be rebuilt by means of legal and organizational solutions that permit maximum use of this agreement, so that Poland may become a full member of the EC one day.

[NOWA EUROPA] Are we to understand that you are not going to seek any amendments to the documents that have been initialed?

[Pawlak] Of course not. We will add to these documents other solutions that will extract from them maximum advantages for Poland.

[NOWA EUROPA] Yesterday the Liberal-Democratic Congress [KLD] and Confederation of Independent Poland [KPN] stated the terms under which they would join the government. What is your opinion?

[Pawlak] We are still considering these proposals. The experience of the coalition talks teaches us that if one sincerely wants an accord, one will find it. I think the KPN has displayed a certain flexibility and has relaxed some of its expectations concerning the budget, though its expectations are still to harsh for the Democratic Union or the KLD. Economic experts from the various parties are still holding talks with each other on the subject of Finance Ministry information on the state of the economy, inciuding our international debts. I think they will find it easier to talk once they have found specific matters to talk about.

[NOWA EUROPA] The Political Council of the Faction of the Democratic Right today announced that it will form a grand coalition of the Solidarity camp, with a different prime minister of course. Are you acquainted with this?

[Pawlak] I think we are living in a free country in which every group is free to express its views. Democracy's strength lies in seeking the best solutions by constantly comparing various options.

[NOWA EUROPA] Your critics claim you only became prime minister because of a peculiar set of circumstances.

[Pawlak] Since the free elections, the PSL has been a full partner in the political arena, so we have counted on the possibility of membership in the government. Thirty percent of rural inhabitants voted for the PSL. The remaining social groups, entrepreneurs, intelligentsia, and especially the workers voted for many parties. In a sense, it is objective necessity that has made a farmers' representative become prime minister.

Daily Discusses Difficulties With Cabinet Talks

AU1806105592 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 15 Jun 92 p 3

[Report by Dominmika Wielowieyska and Jan Bazyl Lipszyc: "Two Coalitions In One?"]

[Text] The Confederation of Independent Poland [KPN] cannot agree with Prime Minister Pawlak and the "small coalition" on a financial policy. The Center Accord [PC], the Peasant Alliance [PL], the Christian-National Union [ZChN], and the Christian-Peasant Party [SChL] want a coalition of all Solidarity groups, which the small coalition might join provided the PSL stays out of it. The ZChN, PL, and SChL do not rule out participating in such a coalition.

Despite the protracted talks with the small coalition —which consists of the Democratic Union, the Liberal-Democratic Congress [KLD], and the Polish Economic Program [PPG]—and with the KPN, Prime Minister Pawlak still believes he will succeed in forming a majority government. On Saturday agreement was reached on some program points; i.e., the rapid adoption of the small constitution and new election code, and the passing of a new broadcasting law.

The Democratic Union, KLD, PPG, and Polish Peasant Party [PSL] agreed on Saturday that it might be necessary to amend the budget, but the new government should, within the space of two months, analyze the economic situation and present a suggestion on how to balance out the budget without increasing inflation. Until then, the Sejm version of the budget will be implemented.

However, the KPN still thinks the budget must be amended forthwith and the deficit increased, so as to finance antirecession activity.

"On Saturday we said that if we cannot resolve the budget issue, there is no point in discussing other matters," said Wito[illegible] Gadomski from the KLD. "Now it is up to the pol[illegible]s to decide."

Four parties—the PC, ZChN, PL, and Christian-People's Party—announced on Saturday that they would definitely not join Pawlak's government. "We will oppose a government that is led by postcommunist forces," they said. Instead, they want to form an alternative coalition and invite all the Solidarity parties to form a government. Speaking about this alternative coalition, Waldemar Pawlak said that the groups with whom he is holding talks have a larger Sejm representation than the PL, PC, ZChN, and SChL.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki, asked whether he wants to talk to these four parties, said that both Pawlak and the small coalition are open to all proposals, but added that "as long as Waldemar Pawlak tries to form a government, the Democratic Union will not change its way of thinking."

Should Pawlak fail, the small coalition foresees a government consisting of all Solidarity groups plus the PSL. However, unofficial sources tell us such a government would not be headed by Pawlak.

According to this scenario, Pawlak would officially transfer his mission to a politician from the small coalition chosen by the president. Pawlak would be deputy prime minister in the new government, and the KPN would not be part of it.

"Such a coalition is possible, but only if Waldemar Pawlak himself gives up his attempt to form a government. However, I do not think he could be deputy premier in such a coalition government," said Aleksander Hall of the Democratic Union.

Politicians from the ZChN, SChL, and PL are also considering the possibility of a compromise coalition, but they told GAZETA that this is merely their own personal opinion and that no decision has yet been made in the matter. They also said they wished to remain anonymous.

Senator Calls for President Walesa's Resignation

LD1706141992 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 1300 GMT 17 Jun 92

[Excerpts] The Senate adopted a resolution in which it decided to present its own draft law on the revealing of former agents of the Security Office and the Security Service. [passage omitted]

Despite the Senate's decision to adopt the resolution, in the second part of its meeting 16 statements on that very subject were made without any debate. The majority of them concerned the president. Senator Henryk Czarnocki asked whom the president served and proposed that both chambers of parliament should consider whether Lech Walesa ought to continue to hold the office of president. The next remarks by senators were a protest against that view or support for the senator. Senator Anna Bogucka-Skowronska categorically spoke out

against insulting the president. Affront has been committed against the president in this chamber and anyone who now attempts to deny him his services is not worthy of sitting at the same table as him, she said.

Solidarity Congress Chides Former Communists

AU1806105992 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 15 Jun 92 p 3

[Jaroslaw Kurski report: "Solidarity With Olszewski"]

[Text] The Solidarity congress was disgusted with the "latest events and the president's part in them" and opposed the transfer of power to postcommunist forces. It called for decommunization, the disclosure of agents, and their removal from political life. The delegates greeted an hour-long speech by Jan Olszewski with great applause.

The congress appointed a 53-man National Commission, to which the chairman of regional branches and branch industrial secretariats will be added. It decided that a new Solidarity statute will be adopted at a separate congress.

It was made clear during the debate that Solidarity will not play the role of a political party, nor will it be a protective umbrella for the government.

On Saturday morning, the delegates loudly applauded a speech by Jan Olszewski. "There is absolutely no reason to believe that my government planned a coup d'etat," he said. "The government was in power, therefore it could only have prepared a coup against itself. No moves of this kind were ever made. No one in Poland is capable of making them. The president being in danger of being placed into custody was nothing but a rumor. This is ridiculous," said Olszewski.

"My government," he continued, "found itself faced with a dilemma, whether or not to implement the Sejm's unimplementable resolution. The government decided to present to the Sejm all the material in the Interior Ministry archives about the persons occupying top state posts. Therefore, this list also contains the names of downright louts and insignificant others. This list has to be taken apart and checked. There has been a storm of demands to make this information secret. I do not know in whose interests that would be, but it would certainly not be in Poland's interests."

Referring to Prime Minister Pawlak's mission to form a government, Olszewski said: "The appointment of a new government today exceeds the capabilities of those who were in such a hurry to depose my government. Replacing the defense and interior ministers and chief of the Office of the Council of Ministers without my government's knowledge is a breach of the law and a violation of the Sejm's sovereignty."

Waldemar Pawlak conveyed to the congress a letter in which he "counts on the congress' meritorious support and assistance" and hopes that "soon there will be a meeting at which all sides will adopt a joint strategy and a method of solving the most pressing problems." The congress did not relate to this letter. A greetings message from Democratic Union leader Tadeusz Mazowiecki also went unanswered.

The Solidarity congress adopted a resolution as follows:

We are disgusted with the events that have occurred in Poland recently and the part played in them by President of the Republic of Poland Lech Walesa.

1. The Solidarity Independent and Self-Governing Trade Union demands the immediate and statutory implementation of decommunization in Poland.

2. It firmly denounces attempts to halt the process of disclosing collaborators of the Security Office [UB] and Security Service [SB] and demands their removal from public life.

3. It firmly opposes the transfer of power in Poland to postcommunist forces.

4. It is of the opinion that a struggle for power has taken the place of work for the benefit of Poland.

We demand from the president, government, and parliament the honest discharging of their duties toward society.

We will no longer tolerate ineptitude, incompetence, and ill will on the part of these institutions.

We demand rapid and energetic action to improve the condition of the Polish economy and counteract the recession.

We demand the quick adoption of a new constitution and new election code to the Sejm.

We demand that Polish Radio and Television be quickly placed under public control.

The Fourth National Congress of Solidarity demands the fulfillment of the Polish president's promises to the people.

President Iliescu Comments on Rio Summit, Elections

AU1806201492 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1831 GMT 18 Jun 92

["President Ion Iliescu's Interview with ROMPRES"—ROMPRES headline; place and date not given]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 18/6/1992—"I think that Romania's participation at such a meeting like that in Rio de Janeiro devoted to environment at a lower level of representation would have seemed strange," President Ion Iliescu told the ROMPRES correspondent accredited to the conference. "The level of participation, the large number of heads of state and government from all continents, the issues discussed proved this," President Iliescu added. He said that the world ecology forum marked an important political moment through the global character of the problems confronting civilization and their reception at the level of political decision makers.

Asked how he received the news that Romania's parliament declared for simultaneous elections at the end of September, President Iliescu answered: "As a tangible outcome and as a constructive reaction to the dialogue I had before leaving for Rio with representatives of the parties, with leaders of parliamentary groups, with the prime minister and the leaders of the two chambers. Receptivity and sense of responsibility was manifest." Assessing this as encouraging for the period to follow, he urged to "a civilized confrontation" during the election campaign.

As to the date when he could make public his decision on his political future, President Iliescu said that should be the result of negotiations, of talks with political parties, so that he could be able to finalize his future intentions. He explained that the statement made in Salaj County—when he hinted he could assume the responsibility of a candidature to presidency—was "a direct answer to requests related precisely to various pressures, urges and summons not to run in elections on the one hand, and the reaction of participants to urge me to run and to express my opinion in connection with this possibility on the other."

Interviewed on Military Issues

AU1806175292 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1529 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 18/6/1992—Under the internal and international circumstances facts must be seen with realism and responsibility. We may not distort them. We must show wisdom, lucidity and sincerity in maintaining a constructive balance despite the difficulties and convulsions we have been passing through, though Romania is an oasis of peace in this area. We can note others are also interested in maintaining this balance, states Romania's President Ion Iliescu in an interview with the newspaper "ARMATA ROMANIEI" (ROMANIA'S ARMY).

Showing that as far as we are concerned we are in the epicentre of a hot area with highly serious and explosive consequences, the president says: Both politicians and citizens are now concerned over the developments in the Republic of Moldova, on the left bank of the Dniester. Mentalities and residues of an imperial nature persist there, seeking to maintain structures that belong to the old empire, which creates highly complicated situations.

In connection with certain speculations made in Romanian newspapers about a potential military dictatorship as a solution to coming out of the current economic and sociopolitical crisis in the country, the president thinks there is no real basis for such fears. On the contrary, the Army, its larger or smaller units are headed by officers who have enough civic and patriotic responsibility not to let themselves drawn into any adventure. It is true we are going through difficult moments. But it is this very fact that makes political forces seek the appropriate resources to achieve the cohesion the country needs so much at such hard times.

President Iliescu states that following his contacts with several military he could get a positive impression of their state of mind and morale [sentence as received]. Certainly, he said, there are many difficult problems our military have to face. We are in such a situation that we must work so as to reduce troops and modernize the Army's equipment to make it more efficient and pass on to professionalism. But this entails a great effort on the part of the national economy which cannot make it now. For the time being we must think realistically of what we must do to duly solve problems according to our possibilities and be any time ready to defend the country's interests.

Referring to the difficulties the military industry is confronted with, the president notes that, unfortunately, this problem occurs against a complex background, in the generally difficult situation in which the economy and, more particularly, industry must be restructured. In this domain there are still unused abilities, which makes the restructuring programme harder. What we could do, what the government endeavours to do is to find ways apt to diminish the hardships this sector faces. There are attempts to find solutions in our foreign relations with traditional partners, including various forms of cooperation. The problems are highly complex and require further attention and concern, the president also states.

Chebeleu on Moldova, Sanctions Against Yugoslavia

AU1806060892 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1842 GMT 17 Jun 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 17/6/1992—At the weekly news conference of Wednesday, June 17, of the Foreign Ministry spokesman, Ambassador Traian Chebeleu informed journalists that the Foreign Affairs Ministry submitted a memorandum to the government on the enforcement of the UN Security Council resolution imposing economic and other sanctions on Yugoslavia. The memorandum sets forth the measures undertaken on the basis of the June 3, 1992 declaration of the government as well as the three exceptions from the

application of the sanctions referring to: The Romanian-Yugoslav cooperation within Iron Gates 1 and 2 water power and navigation systems on the Danube; the convention of cooperation in production in chemistry and petrochemistry, between "Solventul" commercial company of Timisoara and the chemical combine of Pancevo (Serbia); the productive activity of "Comtim Holding S.A." of Timisoara based on contracts for the import of fodder and veterinary medicines from Yugoslavia.

The memorandum is to be sent to the UN Security Council, Romania's Government expressing its belief that, in consideration of the particularly serious effects on Romania of the sanctions against Yugoslavia, appropriate recommendations will be adopted to compensate all material losses.

At his weekly news conference the Foreign Ministry spokesman also referred to the following future activities:

Foreign Affairs Minister Adrian Nastase and Defence Minister Nicolae Spiroiu will attend the first extraordinary meeting of the Western European Union due to start in Bonn on June 19.

On June 20 and 21, Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase will attend, at the invitation of the president of the Crans-Montana Forum Foundation, Jean-Paul Calderon, a meeting of that forum to be attended also by prime ministers, foreign ministers and other politicians, as well as by representatives of business circles.

At the invitation of the Romanian foreign affairs minister, Ahmat Ismat al-Magid, secretary-general of the Arab League, will pay a visit to Romania over June 21-24. He will conduct talks with the chief of the Romanian diplomacy, with the minister of trade and tourism, and will meet with the leaders of the two chambers of Romania's Parliament. The guest will also be received by Romania's President Ion Iliescu and Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan.

Under the auspices of the Romanian Cultural Foundation Neptun will host the forum of Romanians and Romania-born people titled "Diaspora and the destiny of the Romanian culture." Over 100 personalities from all over the world have already announced their participation.

At his weekly news conference, referring to the evolution of the conflict in the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova, the Romanian Foreign Ministry spokesman stressed that the past week was characterised by political efforts to bring about a global and definitive ceasefire in the conflict zone, to separate forces and normalize the situation, efforts made under the auspices of the Parliament in Chisinau. Referring in that context to the resolution of Moldova's Parliament on the basis of which a joint commission was set up made up of deputies and representatives of the armed groups involved in the conflict, he stressed that it immediately passed to fulfilling its mandate calling working meetings in Chisinau and Tiraspol.

Taking part in the activities of the joint commission as observers were also members of the joint quadripartite commission as well as commanders of the national groups of military observers of the Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russia and Ukraine.

Staniloiu Presents Objectives of Interim Program

AU1806193292 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1728 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 18/6/1992—At the Thursday, June 18, news conference, government spokesman Iolanda Staniloiu set forth the objectives of the government programme in the perspective of the September 27 elections and until the formation of the new legislative forum and of the new cabinet. In that context, stress was laid on the government's concerns in the economy and investments in particular for the restructuring of ministries, industrial branches and animal-breeding, finalization of measures meant to prevent the entry of toxic wastes in this country, continuation of the privatization programme, ensurance of stocks of power resources for winter, maintenance of the leu's exchange rate; preparations were also announced for the application, starting September 1, of the 25-percent cut of state subsidies for a number of products and services.

The government spokesman mentioned that the cabinet was preparing a memorandum on the application of the embargo imposed by the Security Council on Yugoslavia, a document to be submitted in the next few days to that international forum. The memorandum presents and gives the reasons for the exceptions Romania is forced to make in applying this embargo—cooperation within Iron Gates water power and navigation systems and the "Solventul" chemical combine, and the import of fodder and medicines for the Comtim complex. Highlighted were also the damages this resolution inflicts on Romania. Romanian relevant ministries and institutions are to examine alternative measures to be carried into effect operatively in case the Security Council will consider the exceptions cannot be maintained, Mrs. Staniloiu further stressed.

Another issue approached during the news conference was the that of toxic wastes introduced in this country and the measures undertaken by the cabinet during its Wednesday meeting to prevent a recurrence of such like cases and to bring to justice those responsible for these deeds.

UN Says Agreement Reached on Arms at Airport

AU1906092092 Paris AFP in English 0850 GMT 19 Jun 92

[Report by David Botbol]

[Excerpts] Sarajevo, June 19 (AFP)—Warring Serbs and Bosnians have reached agreement on removing heavy weapons from around Sarajevo airport and the facility could reopen by the end of next week, a U.N. spokesman said here Friday. [passage omitted]

Adnan Abel-Razek [spelling of name as received], spokesman for the U.N. Protection Force in Yugoslavia, told AFP that the agreement on removing heavy weapons was reached here late Thursday [18 June] in talks mediated by U.N. General Lewis MacKenzie. [passage omitted]

The U.N. spokesman said the agreement was signed Thursday by the Serbs, which have opposed Bosnia-Hercegovina's independence, and was scheduled for signing Friday morning by the Bosnian presidency. He said technical reasons prevented the Bosnian side from signing the accord the night before.

The agreement calls for the withdrawal of Serbian anti-aircraft batteries to a "certain distance" from the airport runways, while Serbian tanks and artillery are to be moved back 30 kilometers (18 miles) from the airport to six sites to be placed under permanent control of U.N. peacekeepers.

Sixty U.N. military observers who reached Sarajevo on Thursday during a lull in fighting should be able to take up position as of Saturday at the six sites, Abel-Razek said.

Izetbegovic, UN's MacKenzie Discuss Convoy

AU1806204092 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Text] After his meeting with General MacKenzie, Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency, stated that despite the problems that have arisen because of the delay of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] convoy in Lukavica, he trusts the UNPROFOR members and is extending them full support in their efforts to lift the blockade of Sarajevo Airport in accordance with the UN Security Concil resolution and authorization.

General MacKenzie presented us with the real reasons as to why the UNPROFOR convoy was delayed in Lukavica and explained that UNPROFOR was not to be blamed. This event resulted in negative reaction among our people, Izetbegovic said, because Lukavica is [words indistinct] of evil. We know the real reasons and still trust UNPROFOR. We will accept the suggestions made by UNPROFOR concerning the lifting of the airport blockade because, after all, they are responsible for doing that.

Regarding the deadline for the completion of this operation, Izetbegovic said that there will a short delay because the Security Council is not meeting over the weekend, but that he personally asked General MacKenzie to speed up all activities so that the delay will be as short as possible.

UNPROFOR, RSK Fail to Reach Agreement

LD1806190292 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1628 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Text] Knin, 18 Jun (Tanjug)—Talks between the representatives of the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] and the Republic of Serb Krajina [Republika Srpska Krajina; RSK] held in Knin today failed to give an answer to the key question—when will the members of UNPROFOR assume responsibility in the north-south sectors.

The Krajina Government president, Zdravko Zecevic, evidently dissatisfied with the course of the talks, stated to the journalists in the Knin press center that General Philippe Morillon's proposal for the peace corps to be deployed only as monitors in the so-called "rose zones" was categorically dismissed.

According to Zecevic, this represents a part of a plan by which Croatia would gradually take over the jurisdiction in these areas where, as he put it, Serbs make up 80 percent of the population.

Zecevic said that General Morillon also expressed pessimism concerning the results of these talks on the deployment of the peace corps, but he added that the talks will be continued at a higher level.

"We will resolutely demand, from now on, for the legitimate Krajina representatives to participate in all negotations concerning Vance's plan and the deployment of UNPROFOR forces," Zecevic said, explaining this standpoint with the changed circumstances, war in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and also with the creation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

"Many circumstances have changed since Cyrus Vance's plan was adopted, and the plan is not a Holy Bible which cannot be changed even for the sake of peace," the president of the Krajina Government said.

Under the current circumstances, the RSK Army will stay where it is now: Along the front lines.

Krajina is still under total transport blockade, and hence, not even humanitarian aid is reaching it, Svetozar Vincic, the trade minister and a member of the RSK State Committee for Cooperation with UNPROFOR, told journalists. A promise made by UNPROFOR and by General Nambiar personally that the Belgrade-Udbina air corridor will be opened, has not be fulfilled.

Krajina representatives assessed today that there can be no dual standards regarding humanitarian aid. While the United Nations is rightly urging the reopening of Sarajevo airport for humanitarian purposes, such aid is not reaching Krajina, athough Udbina airport is ready to receive aircraft, and Krajina is under UN protection.

President To Demobilize 65,000 Army Reservists

LD1806203992 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1900 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Text] President Franjo Tudjman of the Republic of Croatia has ordered the demobilization of a part of the Croatian Army reserve units. The order was given at the suggestion of Defense Minister Gojko Susak and states that the proposed demobilization includes 65,000 members of the Croatian Army reserve units. The order prescribes the demobilization of 50 percent of members of the Croatian Army reserve units, according to the following priorities: People to be demobilized first will be those employed in enterprises and other institutions of special importance for the defense of the country and who are needed for their operations; then people needed for the functioning of enterprises and other institutions of special importance for the defense of municipalities, and students in order to continue their schooling, persons employed in agriculture if conditions for them to work exist, people employed in other countries, private businessmen, and people necessary for the work of private enterprises.

The ordered demobilization is to be implemented by 31 July. The defense minister will adopt a special implementation plan and the order comes into effect at once, states the order of the president of the Republic of Croatia on the demobilization of about 65,000 members of the Croatian Army reserve units.

Troops Amassing Along Bosnian Border Denied

LD1806125692 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in English 1205 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Text] The Croatian Foreign Affairs Ministry has put out an announcement refuting several public statements made by various sources over the past few days. One of these statements appeared in yesterday's CNN world news broadcasts. It reported that Croatia was strengthening its forces along borders with Bosnia-Hercegovina. Also, Slovenian television carried a REUTER news piece which said that President Tudjman and Izetbegovic had signed a military pact that would enable Croatian army units to operate in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Also, at a session of the Italian Parliament in Rome yesterday, Foreign Affairs Minister Gianni de Michelis stated that he possessed information that Croatia was massing troops along its borders with Bosnia and that if this was proven to be true—then an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council should be called in order to discuss the application of sanctions against Croatia. De Michelis said this in response to a request from 60 Italian MP's who were seeking stronger sanctions against Serbia.

The Croatian Foreign Affairs Ministry says it is authorized to state that these claims are unfounded and constitute disinformation. It adds that relevant information concerning military action in Bosnia-Hercegovina could be found in the joint statement issued by President Tudjman and Izetbegovic on 15 June as well as in the statement made by President Izetbegovic at a press conference in Sarajevo held the following day.

Office Chief Denies Violations of Human Rights

LD1806165492 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Text] In response to a letter sent by Helsinki Watch on 22 May to Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, on 12 June the head of the President's Office, Hrvoje Sarinic, sent a reply to Helsinki Watch Director Jeri Laber. The following is stated in the reply:

Mrs. Laber expresses disquiet at, and we quote, the latest measures taken by the Croatian Government to restrain freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly in Croatia. The head of President's Office says in his reply that neither the president nor the Government of Croatia have taken any measures for the purpose as outlined by the Helsinki Watch executive directorate. We wish to reiterate on this occasion that the Republic of Croatia is genuinely and profoundly committed to protecting and implementing basic human rights and freedoms as guaranteed by international documents and the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Mr. Sarinic says in his reply.

As in many other countries, the Republic of Croatia's penal code contains provisions for dealing with certain criminal acts such as slander or offence. The offended party is entitled privately to pursue criminal proceedings. In the case of offences against a state body or an officials, if referring to one's work or position, proceedings are carried out by the public prosecutor. In view of this, the public prosecutor of Croatia carried out proceedings against Tatjana Torbarina and Jelena Lovric. In the case of Viktor Ivancic, Predrag Lucic, and Boris Bezulovic the public prosecutor has merely set in motion investigation to see if there are adequate reasons for an investigation.

In the case of the criminal act of spreading false reports the investigation is being carried out by the public prosecutor. In view of this, a request has been made to set in motion investigation against Milorad Pupovac and Denis Kuljis. In the case of Dobroslav Paraga, proceedings have been set in motion for criminal acts of spreading reports and claims which he knew were false, for attempting to facilitate the escape of an arrested person, for illegally obtaining and possessing weapons and explosive devices, for being a member of a group which attempted to prevent officials from carrying out their official duties, for a call to resist legitimate authorities, and for illegally occupying socially owned property.

All the above-mentioned persons are still at large and their possible guilt will be decided exclusively by a regular court. Neither the president of the Republic nor the Government of the Republic of Croatia have any competence over the court and can neither order nor ban

the public prosecutor from carrying out criminal proceedings. The public prosecutor is fully independent and with no personal motives. The fact that he can be accused of such motives in the press with no consequences indicates that there is freedom of the press and of public opinion in Croatia.

In his reply to the Helsinki Watch letter and in reference to the fact that the Social Democratic Union [SDU] did not hold its constitutive session on 5 May 1992 and that an international peace conference was not held on the island of Vis at the beginning of April, the head of the President's Office, Hrvoje Sarinic, confirmed that a series of very different parties had been set up in Croatia and that there are no reasons to stop the SDU from being set up and that a peace meeting can be held at any time and at whatever venue including the island of Vis which is now under the control of the Croatian authorities.

At the end of his letter, which he sent to New York to Helsinki Watch Executive Director Jeri Laber on 12 June the head of the President's Office guarantees that the Republic of Croatia will continue to take care to insure that neither rights nor freedoms are violated and that it will react to any act of violation according to the provisions of its constitutional system and international resolutions which it endorses.

HSP Leader Dobroslav Paraga Comments on Charges

92BA1071C Zagreb NOVI VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 3 Jun 92 p 3a

[Article by Andrea Latinovic: "Knife in the Back of Herceg-Bosnia"]

[Text] "I think that this is a knife in the back of the defenders of Herceg-Bosnia; through me, an attempt is being made to halt the river of human and technical assistance for defending that region," said Dobroslav Paraga, the chairman of the HSP [Croatian Rights Party], commenting on the charge brought against him by the Opstina Office of the Public Prosecutor in Zagreb.

In an interview with NOVI VJESNIK, Paraga emphasizes that "the charge refers to an announcement by the Imotski branch of the HSP." "That was clearly not a conscription order, but rather an ordinary appeal for HSP volunteers to assist Herceg-Bosnia. The Stalinists in the Croatian government interpret the humane action by the Imotski branch of the party as a criminal act, and that speaks for itself."

The HSP chairman believes that "the charge clearly does not reflect what this matter is really about, what the cause is and what the motivation is." Explaining what this is really about, Paraga alleges that "this is work of Vladimir Seks. The government wants to show that Croatia is not interfering in the war in Herceg-Bosnia, but at the same time it is sending in Croatian generals. The ruling party is afraid of HOS [Croatian Defense Force—military wing of HSP] competition in Herceg-Bosnia."

Vice chairman Ante Djapic, speaking on behalf of the party, also commented on the charge against HSP chairman Dobroslav Paraga. He believes that "the charge is an extension of the campaign of persecution against the HSP. This is a preelection gaffe by the ruling party, which wants to use this to thwart the HSP's normal activities."

Djapic says that "the attack on chairman Paraga and the threat of imprisonment injects an element of unrest into the party." He adds immediately: "But not fear, of course." Djapic's assessment is that beginning with "the charge concerning a verbal offense in Split all the way up to this charge, an effort has been made, using well-known methods, to discredit the HSP and depict it as an ultra-rightwing, extremist organization."

Djapic also shares his chairman's opinion about the charge. "This is clearly not some sort of HOS conscription for the purpose of creating an armed force that would be opposed to the Croatian Armed Forces [HV]. This is an appeal to volunteers from the party to help defend Herceg-Bosnia. The government is blocking assistance."

"What is your opinion about the regulation under which only the president of the republic can order mobilization?" we asked Djapic. "We are in absolute agreement with that regulation, and we respect it. This appeal in Imotski has no connection with pararecruiting. I repeat: This is simply an ordinary appeal for volunteers, because no one can challenge the right of Croats to defend Herceg-Bosnia. We continually emphasize the fact that we respect the command of the Main Staff of the HV, respect that is also realized in the field. The HOS today is primarily active in Herceg-Bosnia, while the other part of the HOS has long been incorporated into the HV."

"Can you provide any arguments to substantiate the allegation that the HOS is in fact part of the Croatian Armed Forces?" we were interested in hearing in conclusion. "Of course; I will give you only one. The numerous dead Croat defenders who were decorated by President Tudjman on Saturday include a large number of HOS soldiers," Djapic responded.

Kucan Says Sanctions Against Serbia Insufficient

AU1806154792 Vienna KURIER in German 18 Jun 92 p 3

[Interview with Slovene President Milan Kucan by Hans Rauscher; place and date not given: "The Sanctions Against Serbia Are Insufficient"]

[Text] [Rauscher] Slovenia gained its independence one year ago after a hard struggle. Now it no longer has anything to do with the Yugoslav catastrophe.

[Kucan] We were well-prepared and lucky. We also warned the international community against the imminent developments in Bosnia and Croatia. Unfortunately, it listened to us too late.

[Rauscher] Dobrica Cosic is now president of the new Yugoslavia, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro. This is seen here as the beginning of Serbian President Milosevic's end.

[Kucan] Milosevic is not the inventor of the Greater Serbia policy, but rather its executive agent. The real creator of this policy is Cosic, co-author of the famous memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences. Cosic's election guarantees that the objectives of the Greater Serbia policy—all Serbs in one state—remain the same. But Cosic will try to push these objectives through in a more civilized manner than Milosevic. He is a man with whom one can sit at the table.

[Rauscher] That is to say, the beginning of Milosevic's end has come?

[Kucan] Slobodan Milosevic will have to go—not because he started the war, but because he lost it or waged it in a way that led Serbia into isolation and resulted in the sanctions against Serbia. By the way, the sanctions are not sufficiently comprehensive. Serbia would also have to be excluded from the United Nations and the CSCE.

[Rauscher] If this does not help, then perhaps a military intervention?

[Kucan] Not yet. It will not be possible to avoid a military intervention if Belgrade loses control over the army units in Bosnia and if individual units run amok. But the Belgrade leadership is still in control now, and therefore pressure must be put on it.

[Rauscher] That is to say, Cosic, but not Milosevic, is a possible partner for talks?

[Kucan] Yes, that is right. Nothing is possible any longer with Milosevic. By the way, he is not the last communist, as it is said, but an oriental, Byzantine despot. If things continue like this, it is only a matter of time until a civil war breaks out in Serbia.

Rupel: Intervention Impossible Without U.S. Help

AU1906095492 Vienna KURIER in German 19 Jun 92 p 3

[Interview with Slovene Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel by Hans Rauscher in Ljubljana; date not given: "Nothing Can Be Done Without the United States as Far as a Military Intervention Is Concerned"]

[Text] [Rauscher] Slovenia has now been independent for one year. How would you describe the international position of the new state?

[Rupel] So far we have been recognized by 90 states, and 20 will open embassies in Ljubljana, including Austria, Germany, Italy, Hungary, France, the United States, and Russia.

[Rauscher] What have you inherited from Yugoslavia?

[Rupel] The issue of succession. The new Yugoslav state, which consists of Serbia and Montenegro, is trying to succeed to the old Yugoslavia on the quiet and to convert all assets to its own use. The new "Yugoslav" president, Dobrica Cosic, wants to take over the Yugoslav National Bank. The bank's assets also belong to others. Slovenia wants its share of 25 percent, the percentage it paid into the Yugoslav budget.

[Rauscher] Some regard Cosic as the possible—moderate—successor to Milosevic.

[Rupel] Cosic used to be a friend of mine. He is a good writer. However, he drew up the program of the Serb nationalists, which is followed by Milosevic. Nevertheless, he might be able to do something. It is now his job to get the Army under control. If he achieves that he will go down in history as the man who saved Serbia. If he does not, he is only a straw man for Milosevic.

[Rauscher] The Serbs are continuing the war in Bosnia. What do you think of military intervention?

[Rupel] Nothing can be done without the United States, and the United States is not prepared to intervene. One must, therefore, try to gradually end the war, and the United Nations must move into one position after the other. If this fails, it is the duty of the Western forces to opt for another, more forceful solution.

[Rauscher] Austria greatly supported Ljubljana in its struggle for independence. That is why some ill feeling was created when Slovenia stated that it wants to succeed Yugoslavia in the Austrian State Treaty.

[Rupel] The State Treaty is a guarantee for the Slovene minority in Austria. We are not exactly fervent supporters of the State Treaty and do not insist on this document, so long as the rights of the Slovenes in Austria

are guaranteed within a European framework. I told my dear friend Mock that we would like to see Austria understand our position. However, it is not a good idea when Vienna now suddenly spots an Austrian or German minority in Slovenia.

[Rauscher] Has Vienna said anything in that direction?

[Rupel] We received a letter from the Foreign Ministry in which we were asked to protect the German minority in Slovenia—if there is such a minority. We are ready to examine the issue in a mixed commission.

Federal

Army Refutes Article on Talks With Draskovic

LD1806221192 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1853 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Text] Belgrade, 18 Jun (TANJUG)—"The Yugoslav Army will act only in accordance with its constitutional responsibilities and will prevent any kind of disorder which could endanger peace and security in the country and provoke internal armed clashes." This is said in the statement of the press service of the Yugoslav Army's General Staff issued today.

In this statement, which was issued in response to today's article entitled "The Army Will Not Involve Itself," published in BORBA about a meeting between Chief of the General Staff Zivota Panic and leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement Vuk Draskovic, it is pointed out that the only true fact in the article is that the meeting really was held on 15 June at Draskovic's request. "All other quotes in the text published by BORBA are arbitrary and incorrect," the statement claims.

General Panic, the statement goes on, within the framework of his current activities, also has met with the representatives of other parties at their requests. The main reason for these meetings was the efforts of the General Staff to avoid internal political confrontations that could endanger the defensive ability of the country as a whole and lead citizens to massive armed clashes, with unforseen consequences. In all these meetings, General Panic stressed, in particular, the standpoint of the military leadership is that all the changes in the political system must be conducted in a democratic way as provided by the Constitution, the statement concludes.

Success of Sanctions Seen as West's 'Illusion'

92BA1064B Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 31 May 92 p 4

[Article by Miroslav Lazanski: "The War and the Sanctions"]

[Text] The sanctions of the United Nations with the political, economic, and transportation measures against Yugoslavia, that is, Serbia and Montenegro, have been voted. This places Yugoslavia in the defendant's box with a new ultimatum to the effect that "unless military operations cease in B-H [Bosnia-Hercegovina], Yugoslavia will be expelled from the United Nations." What is the reason for all this, is this a "conspiracy against Yugoslavia," why has the new Yugoslavia found itself almost isolated, is it a question of a failure to understand the real situation, or "does everyone hate Yugoslavia, Serbia, and Montenegro"?

It is difficult in a newspaper article to elaborate all the causes and motives for civil war and the ruination of Yugoslavia in the borders it occupied up to now. What is left for us now is to concern ourselves with the situation at the moment and its repercussions for the future, as well as to find lessons in the events that have occurred so far.

One of them is that in this type of war, and we are obviously speaking about a low-intensity conflict, the conquering of territory is less important than winning and holding the support of the domestic and especially world public, and in this a very high price is paid for underestimating the media warfare. The insistence of many of the Western media, and indeed even officials, on ideological and historical-mythical windmills in Serbia and Montenegro is, of course, their disastrous mistake, just like the one in Vietnam, but we obviously did not sufficiently oppose that mistake in good time.

What is to be said now that the UN sanctions have taken effect? Will the war in our parts be halted, or will it escalate still more? Time is a commodity of which there is obviously an abundance in the former Yugoslavia. In these parts, battles have been fought for centuries, so that it is always unimportant if a few more decades must be waited for the outcome of this most recent battle.

A sense of urgency in resolving problems, so characteristic of the West, usually does not represent the most essential factor here. For most people in B-H, matters cannot become worse than they are, so that waiting for them to improve, even under the conditions of brutality and violence, is a relatively acceptable alternative. What they "forget" in the West is the fact that the war in B-H differs completely from Western conceptions of war and that the factors that are decisive in this war in B-H operate completely autonomously and independently of Belgrade and Yugoslavia.

The conflict in B-H, in which various "ethnic armies" are taking part, the "blue lilies," the "green berets," the territorial defense, the "patriotic league," with the incredible nature of their violence, is really something that the West has the hardest time understanding. In B-H, violence occurs in inverse proportion to the statement of strategic and ultimate objectives. If the UN sanctions and political dictate of Washington are aimed above all at halting the violence in B-H, even though this is at the moment the sole strategic goal, then this will be yet another expensive and major illusion of the West. After all, the parties to the conflict in Bosnia usually resort to desperate measures when their strategy is exposed.

The massacre of innocent civilians in Sarajevo, the people killed in the bread line, represent too transparent a terrorist action on behalf of the party that does not like the negotiations in Lisbon: the party of Alija Izetbegovic. There is no gunner who from the peaks of the mountains around Sarajevo could hit precisely that group of people in a narrow street with a mortar shell threading between all the roofs of the high-rises, even if he had a spotter plane or laser guidance, which is impossible for this type

of operation. The killing of civilians has undoubtedly had the effect of speeding up the decision on the UN sanctions, although recently no one in the world protested the massacre of innocent members of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] in the crime that occurred in Dobrovoljacka Street.

Lieutenant Colonel John S. Fulton, U.S. Army, head of a seminar at the Postsecondary Military School in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, writes in the journal of the American Ground Forces MILITARY REVIEW, February 1985, pages 60-67: "Assassinations, violence in cities, terrorism, outright armed attacks, mass killings and suicides, the taking of hostages—all of this is resorted to as a means of getting attention and gaining the support of the broad public for objectives that stand on weak legs."

If the UN sanctions have been introduced in order to terminate the violence, killing, and bombardment in B-H, then the order of things in solving the problem is the reverse of what it should be. The violence and killing in B-H are only the consequence and external manifestation of something that the West and especially the EC simply "overlooked."

Following the economic and political pressure, could the new Yugoslavia even become the target of military intervention? Theoretically and practically all of this is possible, but the American war experiences in Granada, where all of 7,000 men, 11 warships, one aircraft carrier and one helicopter, dozens of transport planes were used to take a small and weakly defended little island, indicate that things are not so simple.

Iraq and "Desert Storm" are not a universal model, and there is a big question whether the American public can in a presidential election year put up with the ugly scenes in which Americans are killing and being killed far from home. The American rules of intervention say "that intervention, the removal of the old government and placement of a new government and returning the boys home, must be completed within 90 days at the most."

But in these parts nothing is accomplished that quickly.

Serbia

Foreign Minister Holds Talks With Butrus Ghali

LD1806201192 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0810 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Text] New York, June 18 (TANJUG)—U.N. Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali and Serbian Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic reviewed all aspects of the complicated Yugoslav crisis, including ways to overcome it, in their talk Wednesday [17 June] evening. Both men said the talk was warm and friendly.

Jovanovic informed Butrus-Ghali of the latest developments in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, particularly of the new state bodies formed after the recent parliamentary elections. He also informed Butrus-Ghali of Yugoslavia's stand on the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Jovanovic reiterated Yugoslavia's firm commitment to the immediate cessation of hostilities in Bosnia-Hercegovina. He also stressed that tri-partite talks should continue so that all three republican ethnic communities could reach a consensus.

Jovanovic extended another invitation to Butrus-Ghali and his envoys to visit Yugoslavia. Because he wants them to see for themselves that Yugoslavia's intentions are honest, as well as learn the truth about Serbia's and Yugoslavia's role regarding developments in Bosnia.

Jovanovic warned of the danger of the current developments in Bosnia-Hercegovina. He said the recent agreement between the Croatian and Bosnia-Hercegovina Governments on a joint action against Bosnian Serbs could result in greater clashes.

Yugoslavia's aims in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Jovanovic stressed, do not differ from those of the United Nations: a ceasefire, continuation of talks, and a definite resolution of the problem of the three peoples living in this republic.

Butrus-Ghali asked Jovanovic what Yugoslavia thought about the problems in the Serbian Province of Kosovo and agreed with the Serbian foreign minister that all interested sides had to open a dialogue.

A U.N. committee may be sent to Kosovo, Butrus-Ghali said, in order to inform the U.N. in detail of this important Yugoslav and Balkan problem.

Butrus-Ghali fully understands Yugoslavia's expectations that the U.N. assume a greater role in resolving the complex problems in the territories of the former Yugoslavia. He also understands Yugoslavia's objections to some recent developments within the CSCE and the European Community's overall behavior in resolving the Yugoslav crisis, Jovanovic said.

Comments on UN Visit

AU1806195692 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Interview with Serbian Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic by Tatjana Lenard in New York on 18 June—recorded]

[Text] [Lenard] Mr. Minister, you have just finished your visit to the United Nations. How do you assess this visit?

[Jovanovic] This visit was of an informative nature. The intent was to present the permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council with the truth concerning our position on the crisis in Bosnia, and to brief top UN officials first hand on how we view the activities of the United Nations in the Yugoslav crisis and the two resolutions which [words indistinct] a very difficult

situation. In this sense, judging by the reaction of the people I spoke to, I think that these talks, these meetings, have yielded some benefits. They had the opportunity to hear not only nuances but often new elements in the assessments of the Yugoslav situation. It is probable that some of this will be present in their thinking and in the process of making future decisions concerning our crisis.

In my view, the meetings with the UN secretary general and his assistants, Undersecretaries Petrovskiy and Goulding, as well as with his special envoy Cyrus Vance, were particularly important meetings. I think that all this is part of the joint efforts of both the United Nations and Yugoslavia that our common aim, which is the end of hostilities and the establishment of a just and stable peace, be accomplished as soon as possible, and that this become a lasting reality in Bosnia.

[Lenard] Considering that, in his latest report, the secretary general again mentioned the culprits for the crisis and the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and that the Muslim and Croat factors have been mentioned, do you think that this could influence the future course and the pace of lifting the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?

[Jovanovic] The lifting of sanctions is a long process. There have been no cases of sanctions being lifted quickly; in some people's view they have never been lifted completely. Of course, we are talking about different cases, different situations that cannot be compared with ours. It is certain that, with their balanced approach and with blame also being placed on other sides for the difficult situation, these two reports will help make many members of the Security Council more cautious when it comes to the presentation of a black and white picture, or the drafting of categorical and punishing conclusions and policies on the alleged responsibility of only one side.

After all, this is a firm belief that we established on the basis of the meetings held so far. Even some members who had absolutely shuddered in the past when it came to hearing our side, have now begun to understand the full complexity of the situation and are taking a much more advisable and cautious stand toward the demands for unilateral action in the further course of the crisis.

[Lenard] Thank you.

[Jovanovic] Thank you.

Parliament Agrees Changes Needed as 'Reply' to UN

LD1906074292 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0436 GMT 19 Jun 92

[Text] Belgrade, June 18 (TANJUG)—The parliament of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia reached agreement on Thursday [18 June], after a two-day debate, that there can be no bargaining in terms of state sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the country but that changes in the internal policy are a true reply to the U.N. sanctions.

Expressing general agreement that blackmail from outside was unacceptable, the deputies voiced different opinions as to causes of the international isolation and the blockade of Yugoslavia, i.e. Serbia and Montenegro.

The deputies of the ruling party and a part of the opposition indicated that the ultimate goal of the unilateral and unjust sanctions was the weakening and breaking up of Serbia, ousting the legally elected authorities and installing 'bosses from abroad', as has already been done in some republics of the former Yugoslavia which have seceded.

President of the Serbian Radical Party Vojislav Seselj pointed out that Serbs, if they do not wish their state to be torn into three parts should not replace President Slobodan Milosevic.

The majority of opposition parties, in the first place the strongest, the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), accused the current authorities of being the main culprit and asked for their replacement.

Most of the deputies urged dialogue and compromise among parties so that all political parties in the country may jointly define and defend the state and national interests.

They proposed placing a moratorium on party squabbles until the sanctions are lifted. They also proposed that the new president of Yugoslavia, prominent author Dobrica Cosic, convene an assembly of civilian unity for achieving political agreement on emerging from the crisis.

A motion was made for the president of Serbia to form 'a council of national unity', and for the government to undergo radical reconstruction in order to propose a comprehesive program of measures for the current situation.

The Democratic Party, the second largest opposition party in the Serbian parliament, offered a compromise platform which urges 'the discontinuity of the authorities', leaving them a realistic deadline to withdraw. The party's deputies agreed with the proposal for a radical reconstruction of the government and scheduling early elections for autumn.

The deputies of the National Party of Serbia (NS) launched an initiative for a no confidence vote in the government of Prime Minister Radoman Bozovic, signed by around 30 deputies from another four parties and groups of citizens.

Nis University Students Urged To Join Strike

LD1806145792 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1040 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Text] Belgrade, June 18 (TANJUG)—Students from 15 out of the 28 faculties of the Belgrade University are on strike, the Striker Committee said on Thursday [18 June].

The students, who began their protest on Monday [15 June], demand that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic resign, the Serbian Parliament be disbanded, a national salvation government formed and elections for a constitutional assembly called.

So far, the strike has included only students of the Belgrade University. Students of the electrical-, mechanical- and civil-engineering faculties in Nis have also staged a protest, calling for the Nis University to join the strike, the Belgrade daily POLITIKA quotes Striker Committee Spokesman Milan Milosevic as saying.

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic on Wednesday [17 June] met with a Belgrade University delegation, including the rector, deans, professors and students. Milosevic said the state policy was none of the university's business, adding that "only people can be the arbiter."

Students in the delegation said after the talks they were disappointed in the meeting, adding that Milosevic had taken no stand towards the students' demands.

Milosevic's resignation is demanded also by the Serbian opposition, the Serbian Orthodox Church and a group of members of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Vojislav Seselj, leader of the strongest opposition party in the Yugoslav Parliament—the Serbian Radical Party—said on Wednesday Milosevic "must not resign under pressure," adding that such a move would be an "act of betrayal."

On the other hand, Milosevic has received telegrams of support, mostly from groups of citizens, workers and branches of the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia.

The demands for Milosevic's resignation followed the U.N. Security Council Resolution from May 30, imposing severe sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro which make up the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Hungary's View on Vojvodina Hungarians Discussed

LD1806210292 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0933 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Text] Belgrade, June 18 (TANJUG)—Hungary's anti-Serbian campaign is not abating and it is more and more obvious that some other ambitions lurk behind the facade of concern over the position of the Hungarian national minority in the northern Serbian province Vojvodina.

Official Budapest has so far failed to offer one piece of concrete evidence to corroborate its allegation that Hungarians in Vojvodina are threatened, but this has not prevented it from persistently interfering in the internal affairs of its neighbor and insisting on internationalizing the [words indistinct]

"We don't expect of Hungary to be on our side, but we expect of it to abide by the principle of good-neighborly relations", Serbian Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic warned on Monday [15 Jun].

Jovanovic told the Hungarian dailies NEPSZADSAG and NEW HUNGARY that "the Yugoslav crisis is too complicated to allow the country's neighbors a one-sided approach. Hungary has, unfortunately, sided with the breakaway Yugoslav republics from the very beginning and contributed to Yugoslavia's disintegration together with the other neighbors."

Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszensky has so far led the block which has been trying internationalize the alleged threat to ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina.

Jeszenszky requested of the NATO Cooperation Council in Oslo to send peacekeeping troops to Vojvodina and the southern Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija in order to stop violence from spreading in these parts of Serbia.

"It is in Serbia's interest if the world does something to prevent the eruption of new hotbeds of crisis on Serbian territory," Jeszenszky told Hungarian reporters in Oslo.

In his interview to the Hungarian daily MAGYAR HIRLAP on Tuesday [16 Jun], Jeszenszky expressed [word indistinct] that Serbia interprets his request as "a hostile act" because "it was first the international community and then Yugoslavia itself that proposed the deployment of peace-keeping forces in Yugoslavia".

The international community never proposed sending peacekeeping forces to Vojvodina and Kosovo, as Jeszenszky requests, nor did Yugoslavia support such a proposal. Yugoslavia's request regarded the deployment of U.N. peace-keepers to war-torn regions in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina.

"Hungarians in Vojvodina are in no way endangered and it is clear that such a proposal is in the service of some other ambitions and intentions", Jovanovic assessed.

Around 350,000 of Vojvodina's two million citizens are ethnic Hungarians.

Contrary to what Hungary claims, they are ensured schooling in their mother tongue—from elementary to university levels. Along with Serbian, the Hungarian language is officially used in 29 of Vojvodina's 45 communes. Nine of Vojvodina's communes also officially use Slovakian, six use Ruthenian and one uses Czech.

Ethnic Hungarians and other Vojvodina national minorities boast their own theaters, publishing, cultural societies, press, TV and radio programs ...

The Vojvodina association "Hungarians for their Motherland Serbia and Yugoslavia" said on June 11 that "international committees can freely come to Yugoslavia and see for themselves that Hungarians and other minorities there aren't threatened in the least".

Recent statements made by Hungarian senior officials—that Vojvodina was never a part of Serbia, but Yugoslavia, and that the disintegration of the Yugoslav state opens the question of the province's future status—also show that something else lies behind Budapest's unfounded concern over Hungarians in Serbia.

Budapest is obviously deliberately ignoring the fact that, after Serbia won the war against Austro-Hungary (1914-1918), the Slav majority in Vojvodina decided to join the Kingdom of Serbia, not Yugoslavia, which was founded later.

Possibility of Foreign Intervention in Serbia

92BA1071D Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian
29 May 92 p 18

[Commentary by Aleksandar Tijanic: "Assault on Dedinje"]

[Text] Three years ago, serious doubts were raised about the military savvy of Dr. Bora Jovic. At that time, he ruptured an eardrum by firing a pistol—without wearing protection for his ears—and spent several days in the hospital. These doubts took on definitive proportions five days ago; specifically, no sooner had the Yugoslav Presidency (the session was presided over by the second in command, the renowned military leader Dr. Branko Kostic) announced an end to the direct threat of war than a direct threat of war, for the first time, pulled up to Serbia's door. Naturally, from the viewpoint of the average citizen here, the question is this: Is it Belgrade's turn to experience the war first-hand, now that the foreign media are no longer even talking about the appropriateness of military intervention, but instead only about what form it will assume and who will carry it out?

On Tuesday, I discussed the possibilities of an "Operation Balkan Storm" with an independent British analyst. In his opinion, the Serbs have "hit rock-bottom" in the world's eyes, so that the variant of a military option cannot be ruled out, even though it is not possible at the moment. According to him, pacifist groups—thus, "Greens"—and pro-Arab organizations previously took to the streets to protest intervention against Saddam Husayn. Today, given the state of public opinion, he does not believe that anyone in Europe would protest intervention in Serbia. If we exclude the emigre community.

Since we have already been placed under a political, economic, and transport quarantine, the talk about military pressure has two goals. First of all, the predominantly U.S. pressure is directed towards the Milosevic regime. But as is usually the case when the Americans involve themselves in Europe, here too matters are acquiring an aspect from which Milosevic profits politically. Instead of seizing upon a policy whose severity has given rise to opposition and whose crudeness has engendered hatred, pressure is being exerted against the entire nation—according to the principle of collective guilt—thus confirming the theory about a universal "conspiracy against the chosen people." The second goal, also typically American, is to pull on Europe's ears, the same Europe that has been grappling unsuccessfully with the war in the former Yugoslavia for an entire year. But also to demonstrate to the world what happens to anyone who violates the prescribed "house rules" in the future.

If there are really any military forces ready for action at this time (the adoption of a political decision by the Security Council or CSCE on intervention is less of a problem), then U.S. forces, with the cooperation of NATO brigades—because of the internationalization of the blood test for "contractors"—would first occupy the skies over Serbia and Bosnia with their airplanes from the Sixth Fleet or fighters stationed for this purpose in Hungary, Greece, Bulgaria, and probably Albania as well. In the second act, they would attack concentrations of Karadzic's and Mladic's forces, carry out a landing operation in Sarajevo, occupy the airport, overwhelm the Serbian artillery positions above the city with cluster bombs, and plow over runways suitable for use by local aviation. UN military observers, who have followed this war "live" and who have seen all the local armed forces in action, are greatly underestimating when they talk about "brigands" whose military preparedness is drained by acts of terror against members of other ethnic groups—unarmed ones, if possible. They feel that professionals would not have much a problem occupying the strategic cities of Bosnia. Thus, there is even talk of "surgical" intervention: It should be militarily minimalist and highly sophisticated in terms of technology, enjoy international support in terms of politics, and serve the function of a hypothetical peace plan, which would relieve the conscience of international institutions.

By these calculations, no targets in Serbia would be attacked (if the airplanes from our air force stay inside the country), or in the event of major complications, headquarters, command centers, and important military targets would be destroyed by cruise missiles. As foreign analysts note cynically, care would be taken to see to it that fewer civilians be killed in these attacks than the number who die each month in the domestic war. It is figured that the interventionist corps would have to have, with very limited targets, around 50,000 soldiers, and that it would cost $10 billion. Not counting the losses in personnel and equipment by those who do not like for their president to be chosen by foreign soldiers,

but counting on the cooperation of those (their numbers and their names remain unknown) who fearfully contemplate the possibility that the Americans will attack us and that we will defeat them!

Gen. Panic's army, if it does not enter into the mismatched battle, would lose its honor, and he would lose his post; the circle would tighten around Milosevic, while Karadzic would be militarily neutralized. These are words on paper. Sober observers warn that a month would be needed just to prepare for any intervention of this sort and that even after an successful invasion, the question would remain: "What now?" Specifically, just as journalists like to compare Milosevic and Saddam, experts too compare the results of "Desert Storm" with the desires of its planners. Thus, they note that there is not a single well-founded reason to believe that in a country where people are being slaughtered with such relish, diplomacy could suddenly—and after a thrashing by international forces—become more effective than it is now. Besides, they warn, Saddam lost 30,000 soldiers, 2,500 tanks, 260 airplanes, and 1,400 cannons, but at the same time, he solemnly declared these results to be a "magnificent victory over the infidels."

Furthermore, his regime has held fast for six months under the total isolation of a sea, air, and land blockade, and Saddam has used this time to step up the settling of scores with his weak internal opposition. He has blamed the inhumane West, domestic traitors, and an international conspiracy for the hunger and the slow death resulting from the shortage of medicine and from economic collapse. The war did not topple Saddam, it did not feed the Kurds, nor did it bring democracy to the Middle East. All of these are reasons why it is hard to have faith in classic military intervention, but warnings about grounding the air force, about taking away Yugoslavia's "air sovereignty," or about Belgradians being driven into bomb shelters by planes flying overhead are very serious, and that is precisely how they should be regarded. Admittedly, the Americans are practical people who are very reluctant to get into situations that could remind them of their experience in Vietnam, especially since in European ethnic conflicts it is difficult to tell whether there are good guys and bad guys and whether there is even a sheriff in town.

In recent days, Milosevic, himself aware of how much the Vukovar-Dubrovnik-Mostar-Sarajevo progression is becoming an illustration for the international "wanted" poster, has taken some steps that are interpreted as desire on his part to put a significant amount of distance between himself and Karadzic. I assume that this is why the new head of the counterintelligence service, Gen. Boskovic, after the successful evacuation of one of the besieged Sarajevo barracks, appeared on Belgrade Television and publicly praised Izetbegovic's attitude and the "constructivism" of the Bosnian minister of defense, Jerko Doko—a man who does not exactly have a good reputation. If Boskovic did that on his own, then he will be retired soon. If he did not, then it is clear proof of the touching cooperation between the Army and the Bosnian authorities, whom the "brigands" (the general showed a bullet fired at his car) are keeping from deserting to either one side or the other. This is the crowning proof that Bosnia is a country in which anything is possible, and that the real goal of any invasion is not Belgrade itself, but rather one of its hills.

Macedonia

Gligorov Scores Greece's Rejection of Talks

AU1906064992 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 15 Jun 92 p 6

[Interview with President Kiro Gligorov by Viktor Meier in Skopje on 14 June: "Athens Not Interested in Negotiations"]

[Text] Skopje, 14 Jun—Macedonian President Gligorov found harsh words for Greece's position on the recognition of his country. It is extremely unyielding and boils down to a dictate and ultimatum. Greece is not interested in negotiations with Macedonia and stated that the condition for talks is a change of the name of Macedonia. It is an unprecedented situation to have a country demand in a virtually extortionate way that another change its name. For Macedonia that is unacceptable. The Macedonians know very well that in the geographical and historical sense, the term Macedonia covers a wider area than that of the current state of "Macedonia," Gligorov said. Nevertheless, it is the name under which the Slavic Macedonians fought for autonomy—initially along with others —then they used it when they disassociated themselves from the Serbs and Bulgarians, and then linked it to their newly emerging state in 1944—still within the framework of Yugoslavia. The Macedonians have, therefore, an equal right to the name of Macedonia and, incidentally, do not want to compete for it with the Greeks. The term "Republic of Macedonia" sufficiently clarifies all restrictions and limitations.

Gligorov pointed to the severe consequences and dangers resulting from the EC's tendency to take a wait-and-see attitude regarding recognition and thus leaving the situation in the southern Balkans unsettled. This attitude encourages all those who are interested in exploiting the unclear situation in that region or even turning to open aggression. The EC was told by the CSCE to clarify the issue of recognition. The EC arbitration committee, headed by legal expert Badinter, clearly stated that, following the constitutional changes carried out in Macedonia, the conditions for recognition are now fulfilled. So why does the EC refuse to take the necessary step? As a result of its attitude, it is also preventing Macedonian membership in the CSCE and the United Nations. It is creating major economic difficulties for Macedonia and preventing the consolidation of the new national entity. It is a test for the entire EC. Does one want to punish Macedonia for having won independence peacefully, by clever negotiations with the Serbs and the army and not through a war like Slovenia,

Croatia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina? Macedonia has not harmed anybody, it does not have any other claims than becoming an equal member of the family of states and being spared a boycott or similar measures, Gligorov said.

The Macedonian president regards as positive that Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis wants to recognize Macedonian independence and integrity and now even has offered to settle various problems. However, since this is being linked to a change of name, which Athens is even trying to enforce through a number of unfriendly measures, Greece is destroying the important basis for subsequent cooperation. Gligorov recognized Mitsotakis' political difficulties at home, but believes that it would be better to restrain nationalist emotions instead of getting caught in positions that are difficult to abandon. Instead of offering cooperation, Greece is now even obstructing traffic. Sometimes, goods are let through at the border, other times they are not, so that one cannot really speak of an authentic border blockade. Greece does not help Macedonia at all to overcome the problems regarding the connections with the outside world that were created as a result of the war in Yugoslavia, particularly as far as telephone lines are concerned. Since the border with Greece is also Macedonia's border with the EC, the question arises whether this attitude is in line with EC criteria, particularly since it also affects trade interests of other EC states, and whether it is really the EC's intention to set up a blockade against third countries. Gligorov said that Macedonia has not set up any obstacles at all for transit traffic from Greece to Europe. It is taking part in the UN sanctions against Serbia, although the republic suffers $2.5 billion a year in damage as a result of close relations with Serbia. A team of EC specialists will soon be dispatched to Skopje on a fact-finding mission. As a result of the Greek obstacles, Macedonia must try to open new transit routes through Albania and Bulgaria, which is difficult.

Gligorov said that Macedonia wants to pursue a policy of "equal distance" vis-a-vis all neighbors. He noticed some "progress" as far as Bulgaria is concerned, more and more of whose leading politicians are recognizing not only the state as such but also the national awareness of Macedonians. He praised the moderating influence exerted by Albania on the Albanians in Macedonia and pointed to Turkey's great interest in and understanding for Macedonia.

The Macedonian president admitted that, in the past, Macedonia also did and expressed "stupid things" to Greece. Macedonia is now suffering from the after-effects. Gligorov said that when he became president, nationalist circles tried to commit him to a policy in their spirit. However, he did not falter to go the other direction, a direction that now prevails in Macedonia. Today, Macedonia is no longer a nation state, but a "state of the citizens," it does not have any claims and does not interfere anywhere, and—despite some prejudice—it found the path of reconciliation with its Albanians at home. If one recognizes Macedonia and lets it have its way, it is absolutely able to survive and make an important contribution to stability in the southern Balkans, Gligorov concluded.

Albanian Delegation Visits, Meets With Premier

AU1806160792 Tirana ATA in English 0912 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Text] Tirana, June 18 (ATA)—A delegation of the Republic of Albania led by the vice premier and minister of agriculture and food, Rexhep Uka, at the invitation of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, paid an official visit to this republic. The delegation was made up of Fatos Bitincka, minister of transports, Osman Shehu, minister of tourism, etc.

Mr. Uka and other members of the delegation had talks with the Vice Premier of the Republic of Macedonia Jovan Andonov. The delegation was received also by the Premier Nikolla Klusev. They talked on questions of common interest and voiced the wish for all sided relations of good neighbourliness. Mr. Uka voiced the readiness of the Albanian Government for the consolidation of the relations with Macedonian firms and the completion of accords in various fields for a better climate between our two neighbouring countries. In the talks Mr. Rexhep Uka spoke of the predisposition of the Albanian Government to recognize Macedonia as an independent republic, but the recognition and cooperation, he stressed, are closely linked with the stand of the Government of Macedonia towards the Albanian people living in this republic, who make up a great number and cannot never be considered a minority, as various circles try to consider it. They talked also on the situation in Kosovo, the problems of the Yugoslav crisis and of our region, etc.

The Macedonian party voiced the desire for an all round cooperation, a greater circulation of the people in both sides of the border by facilitating the granting of visas, etc.

Mr. Uka had a warm meeting with the group of Albanian deputies in the Macedonian Parliament.

Montenegro

Minister Denies Deportation of Muslim Refugees

LD1806211392 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1225 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Excerpts] Podgorica, 18 Jun (TANJUG)—Montenegrin Internal Affairs Minister Pavle Bulatovic has denied the claim of Dzavid Sabovic, one of the leaders of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] in Montenegro, that Muslim refugees from Bosnia-Hercegovina in this republic are being arrested and "taken away to an unknown destination," and that this is being done by

armed members of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] of Bosnia-Hercegovina with the agreement and assistance of employees of the Montenegrin Ministry of Internal Affairs.

At a meeting yesterday of the Montenegrin Government with the opposition, Bulatovic said that there are now 36,000 refugees from Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia in Montenegro. [passage omitted]

He stressed that there is no campaign against Muslim refugees in Montenegro. There was a dispatch from the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina asking for those eligible for military service to be handed over. Officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs turned back a number of people at the border, and others from Montenegro. However, this measure was discontinued after two or three days. There are no longer deportations of refugees, Pavle Bulatovic said.

Montenegrin Presidency President Momir Bulatovic also has said in connection with the claim that "it is absolutely impermissable that there should be any deportation of refugees."

Nominations Announced for FRY Prime Minister

LD1806083192 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0555 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Text] Podgorica, June 18 (TANJUG)—The main board of the ruling Montenegrin Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) decided on Wednesday [19 June] evening to candidate the republican president Momir Bulatovic and Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic for the post of Yugoslav prime minister.

President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) Dobrica Cosic has begun consultations with party leaders on the candidates for the post of federal prime minister. FRY is made up of the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro.

FRY president should accept their proposal in order to ensure Montenegro's equality in the common state and propose to the Federal Parliament that DPS' candidate be appointed premier-designate, the DPS main [words indistinct].

Under the FRY Constitution, since the Yugoslav president is from Serbia, the candidate would have to be from the Republic of Montenegro, DPS said.

No Accord Signed Between Government, Opposition

LD1806202192 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0803 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Text] Podgorica, June 18 (TANJUG)—The dialogue between the authorities and opposition of the Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro, marked by confrontations over how to overcome the difficult situation resulting from the U.N. sanctions, ended on Wednesday [17 June] night with no accord.

The republic's authorities proposed the formation of a committee for civil peace and national equality, and representatives of ten opposition parties suggested the foundation of a government of democratic unity.

The opposition also presented ten requests and said it would continue the dialogue only if the requests were accepted.

Montenegrin Deputy Prime Minister Zoran Zizic said a committee for civil peace and national equality would be made up of one representative from each party in the parliament, representatives of the three religious communities and the Constitutional Court president, and would be headed by the president of the republic.

The committee would be engaged in initiating political declarations and other acts aimed at preserving peace, rights and freedoms of the citizens, Zizic said. The activities of the committee would be subject to public scrutiny.

The opposition said the committee could solve only a segment of the problem, but could not protect the republic from "foreign intervention, civil war and possible hunger."

The opposition called for the formation of a "government of civil unity," which would consist of representatives of the parliamentary parties and independent members. The task of such a government would be to call the elections for a constitutional assembly and create conditions for new elections in the republic.

The opposition also said Montenegro should recognize all the republics of former Yugoslavia and open negotiations with them about a new integration. Montenegro should also meet the demands contained in the U.N. Security Council resolution, imposing severe sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic said "some of the opposition's proposals" indicated that an "offensive to take over power" was at issue. Some other proposals, he added, were a round about way of achieving a sovereign and independent Montenegro, which is what some parties have urged.

Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic said some of the raised questions could be put in the regular parliamentary debate.

Work of Albanian Party Discussed

AU1806083192 Zofingen RILINDJA in Albanian 10 Jun 92 p 8

[I. Berjashi article: "They Do Not Accept Political Impositions"]

[Text] Current political trends call for great vigilance in watching the movements of the times and adapting to the situation in which one lives. The Albanians in Montenegro have the political and intellectual strength to build what they desire. Of course, time will not wait and matters must be taken in hand without prolonging and elaborating standpoints, conclusions, resolutions, replies, etc. The people are a witness to this, and have unhesitatingly, unflinchingly, and unwaveringly made their point three times. The first time was when they gathered in the Democratic Forum of Albanians in Montenegro, which was a pioneer in launching multiparty thinking among Montenegro's Albanians, and led, secondly, to the birth of the Democratic Alliance of Montenegro [Lidhja Demokratike ne Malin e Zi, LDMZ], which has gained the confidence of about 80 percent of the republic's Albanian population. The third time was in the most recent results of the elections for "deputies to the Citizens' Chamber of the FRY Assembly." This confidence has thus been confirmed three times.

The LDMZ, together with its coalition parties of the Party of Democratic Action in Rozaje and the Party of National Equality in Plava, issued a communique two or three weeks before the elections for deputies to the so-called Citizens' Chamber of the FRY Assembly, stating that it would boycott these elections because "the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina is continuing, human and national rights are being most flagrantly violated in Kosovo, and not even the constitution of the new Yugoslavia suggests any improvement in the rights of Albanians and Muslims." The electors kept their promise, heeded the LDMZ's recommendation, and boycotted the 31 May elections, just as they had boycotted the referendum on Montenegro's legal and national status. In its program and the policies it later adopted, the LDMZ committed itself to equal rights for the Albanians in Montenegro alongside the Montenegrins and others, and also committed itself to Montenegro's becoming a sovereign state. We have witnessed what has happened, but matters should be viewed in the broader context of the pan-national movement for the creation of a new society of a kind familiar to the civilized and democratic world. This is a goal to be realized, and means that we must not take too seriously the loss of any particular post in local government, for instance in Ulqin [Ulcinj], where local government has now lost all its competences because the republican government is trying to centralize all authority as fast and as savagely as possible, dismissing Albanians from their jobs and employing non- Albanians. The Ulqin local government seems to be silently acceding to these changes made "by decree," and the party that "holds" the local government here has not raised its voice. A fax sent to the republican government produces no results. One must sit down face to face with this republican leadership that "promises" a "package of rights" for ethnic groups. The removal of Albanian-language signs in Ulqin, and the dismissal and transfer of Albanian managers from their workplaces, the drafting of school textbooks and curricula without the legitimate representatives of the Albanians... What sort of rights are these?

The recent elections and the Albanians' boycott of them indicate a great deal. Still unofficial reports show that 80 percent of the population in Ulqin did not vote. In Kraja in Tivar [Bar] commune, only 49 people out of a population of more than 4,000 voted, while nobody at all voted in Ftjan. All the voters among the 232 Albanians of the village of Decaj in Rozaje Commune boycotted the elections, not to forget the 565 voters registered in Vuthaj [Vusanje] in Plava commune, of whom, as the republican media reported, not a single one went to the polls. The overwhelming majority of the Albanians in the highlands also boycotted the "federal elections."

One truth is very clear: The LDMZ, both among the Albanians and for the broader public inside and beyond Montenegro, has found a place on the political map. Another truth is that the Albanians trust this party to represent them: The Albanians in Montenegro have founded no other party that could compete with it in defining their status in the republic. The electorate has many criticisms of the LDMZ Presidium because of its extreme idleness over many issues or its failure to act on many of the promises it made during the electoral campaign. Often, the posing of many demands or a declaration of autonomy are made conditional on eventually taking over the local government of Ulqin! Nobody can dare to ignore the will of the people for the sake of two or three official posts. Two years ago, the LDMZ Presidium called on Albanians to vote for the party, which they did with great enthusiasm. They were recommended not to take part in the referendum for the union of Montenegro and Serbia, and they refused to participate in a very dignified fashion. They have now also heeded the call not to vote for the deputies to the Citizens' Chamber of the Federal Assembly. This indicates strong unity and a healthy political basis on which to build the future. Anybody would envy this genuine political wisdom of the electorate, who are determining their own future in a disciplined and cultured way. It obliges the LDMZ Presidium and the leaders of the party's branches to do their utmost to achieve the goals of so faithful an electorate. If they are intellectually or politically not in a position to do this, they would do better to resign. If your activities dry up, it is up-to-date, helpful, moral, and useful to give your place to others who have the energy, enthusiasm, and new vision that will enrich and improve the party program to the future good of the cause of the Albanians in Montenegro. The meeting of the LDMZ Presidium held in the party's headquarters in Tuzi on 28 April this year has been interpreted in many ways, because a council was formed to organize a referendum. This council is not working, and is probably going the way of other councils. As we reported in our newspaper a few days ago, the Ulqin Branch asked for public meetings to be held at which the people would have their own say over whether they want

a referendum on autonomy or not. As far as we are aware, such meetings have so far not been organized. In these times, we cannot wait for days of "milk and honey." The longer this test is delayed, the more manipulation there will be. There is no more urgent issue for the Albanians of Montenegro, not even the question of obtaining bread during this period of total isolation brought upon us by the obstinacy of the Serbo-Montenegrin wielders of power. The most appropriate model is the one used by the Hungarians of Vojvodina led by Andros Agoston. The LDMZ Presidium must speak out, because the people will not accept the impositions of any political party when it is a matter of the goals the party claims it will achieve for them tomorrow.